

Canadian Diplomacy and the Hungarian Revolution

1956-1957

La diplomatie canadienne pendant la révolution hongroise

1956-1957

A kanadai diplomácia az '56-os magyar forradalom idején

1956-1957



Un Aperçu • A Documentary Perspective • Dokumentumgyűjtemény

[magyar előszóval]

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Photo de la couverture: Des réfugiés hongrois attendent leur tour à la légation du Canada à Vienne, en Autriche, 1956. (Bibliothèque et Archives Canada, PA 124953)

Cover Photo: Hungarian refugees wait their turn to be processed at the Legation of Canada in Vienna, Austria 1956. (Library and Archives Canada, PA 124953)

ELŐSZÓ / INTRODUCTION

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1956 januárjában az európai béke és biztonság szempontjából reménytelibbek voltak a kilátások, mint az előző tízegy-néhány évben bármikor. Sztálin 1953-ban bekövetkezett halála, az 1954. májusi genfi konferencia és a szintén Genfben, 1955-ben megrendezett csúcscértekezlet, melyen 1945 óta először ültek tárgyalóasztalhoz a szovjet és a nyugati vezetők, mind a nemzetközi feszültségek enyhülését sejtették. Louis Saint-Laurent kormányfő kabinetjét azonban nem győzték meg ezek a fejlemények, ezért 1955 őszén elküldték Moszkvába Lester B. Pearson külügyminisztert, helyzetfelmérés céljából. A kanadai diplomácia vezetője nagyra értékelte mozgalmas találkozóját Nyikita Hruscsov szovjet miniszterelnökkel, akiről később azt mondta, hogy csak egy a világ egyik legnagyobb hatalmú emberévé lett ukrán paraszt lehet egy személyben ennyire nyers és zabolátlan. A liberális és realista szemléletű Pearson, aki 1955 novemberében tért vissza Ottawába, óvatos optimizmussal fogadta a „békés egymás mellett élést” szorgalmazó szovjet javaslatot.

Hruscsov 1956 februárjában, a Kommunista Párt XX. Kongresszusán elhangzott, Sztálint „leleplező” beszéde jelentősen hozzájárult Kanada Moszkva szándékaiba vetett bizalmának megerősödéséhez. „Kétségtelen, hogy Sztálin mítosza szertefoszolóban van – adott hangot elégedettségének Pearson, majd hozzátette: Minden esély megvan rá, hogy halála után Sztálin holttestét – Oliver Cromwelléhoz hasonlóan – felakasztják és felnégyelik.”² A szovjet politika enyhülése és a liberalizáció egész kelet-európai térséget átjáró fuvallata arra készítette a külügyminisztériumi tisztviselőket, hogy felülvizsgálják a szovjet érdekszférába tartozó államokhoz fűződő viszonyukat. Robert Ford, az Európai Igazgatóság vezetője s egyben a Szovjetunióval kapcsolatos kérdések legnevesebb kanadai szakértője, határozottan amellett szállt síkra, hogy a kormány erősítse gazdasági, tudományos és kulturális kapcsolatait ezekkel az országokkal. „Ezek a diktatúrák nem fognak megdőlni írta 1956 júniusában –, ezért inkább arra kellene törekednünk, hogy elfogadhatóbbá tegyük őket a magunk számára. Bátorítanunk kell Moszkvával szembeni önállósodási törekvéseiket, ugyanakkor világossá kell tennünk, hogy nincsenek háborús szándékaink, és a fennálló társadalmi és politikai berendezkedésüket sem szeretnénk radikálisan megváltoztatni.”³

Kelet-Európa népei mégis változásra vágytak, és azt szerették volna, ha ezekre minél előbb sor kerül. 1956 őszén a kanadai tisztviselőket alaposan meglepték a „nacionalista” színezetű lengyel és magyar kommunista rezsimeket meggingató megmozdulások. A kanadai diplomaták hasonló csodálkozással fogadták, amikor október végén a magyar értelmiségiek és egyetemisták felkelése következtében a szovjet csapatok Budapest elhagyására kényszerültek. Amint az a kötet első dokumentumai bizonyítják, a kanadaiak kezdetben az ENSZ gyors beavatkozásában

¹ 237. távirat, Bonnból (Pearsontól) Ottawába, (1955. október 15.) In: Donaghy, Greg (szerk.) 1999. *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 21: 1955*, Canada Communication Group, Ottawa, 1167. o.

² Pearson, Lester B.: Memorandum for the Prime Minister (1956. március 27.) In: Donaghy, Greg (szerk.) 2002. *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 23: 1956-57 Part II*, Canadian Government Publishing, Ottawa, 911. o.

³ Ford, Robert: Memorandum by Head, European Division (1956. június 12.) In: *ibid.* 877. o.

reménykedtek, mely véget vetett volna az er szaknak és lehet séget teremtett volna Nagy Imre miniszterelnök kormánya számára, hogy békés kompromisszumot kössön Moszkvával és megteremtse egy liberális államrend alapjait.

A remény azonban szertefoszlott, amikor néhány nappal később a szovjet katonák és harckocsik újra bevonultak a magyar fővárosba, majd kegyetlenül leszámoltak a gyengén felfegyverzett felkel kkel és felállítottak egy bábkormányt. Mivel Magyarországról csak szórványos információkat kaptak, Pearson és munkatársai a távolból próbálták értelmezni az eseményeket. „A felkel k, és az követeléseiket mindenáron teljesíteni akaró Nagy Imre hibája az volt – magyarázta Jules Léger, akkori külügyminiszter-helyettes, hogy túlságosan gyorsan, túlságosan messzire merészkedtek.” [12. dokumentum] Jules Léger hasonló szigorral ítélte el, hogy az általa „teljesen érzéketlennek” nevezett nyugati államok képtelenek voltak megfelelen reagálni [11. dokumentum]. A valóság még ennél is szomorúbb volt. Bár Léger azt nem állítja, hogy az újbóli magyarországi szovjet hatalomátvétel a Szuzei-csatorna visszafoglalása céljából október 29-én indított francia- brit offenzíva következménye volt, meggyőződése szerint a két meghatározó NATO-tag közel-keleti kalandja elfordította az ENSZ-ben az afro-ázsiai országokat a Nyugattól, amelynek emiatt nem sikerült kihasználnia Moszkva Budapesttel kapcsolatos kezdeti bizonytalankodását és egy Magyarország számára kedvező megoldást kialakúnia.

Az olvasókat talán meglepi, milyen sok dokumentum szól a magyarországi eseményekkel kapcsolatos indiai reakciókról. Ez nem véletlen. Az 1940-es évek végétől a kanadai döntéshozók hatalmas erőfeszítéseket tettek India és az el nem kötelezett afrikai és ázsiai országok vezetőjének tekintett indiai miniszterelnök, Jawaharlal Nehru megnyerésére⁴. A magyarországi forradalom e politika próbakövének volt tekinthet , és számos problémát felszínre hozott. India és követői csak vonakodva voltak hajlandók a magyar ügy mellé állni New Yorkban, ami számos kanadai diplomatának keserúséget és csalódást okozott. „Azt hiszem, be kell vallanunk – ismerte el Ford –, hogy az ENSZ Magyarországgal szemben tanúsított magatartása hatalmas kudarc volt. (...) Az arab és ázsiai országok egyszerűen nem akarták megérteni azt a leckét, amiből ők maguk is sokat tanulhattak volna a szovjet rendszer természetéről.” [55. dokumentum]

Bár tökéletesnek nem voltak mondhatók, Kanadának a forradalom után egész Európát ellep magyar menekültáradattal kapcsolatos intézkedései sokkal pozitívabb példának tekinthetők, mint az ENSZ-ben tanúsított közönye. Háború utáni virágzó gazdaságának köszönhetően Kanadában minden adott volt e probléma hatékony kezeléséhez, és Pearson mindent meg is tett annak érdekében, hogy a kormány hozzájárulását biztosítsa. Ideológiai és humanitárius megfontolásoktól vezérelve a külügyminiszter a menekültek irányába országos, illetve nemzetközi szinten megnyilvánuló szolidaritáshoz méltó bőkezúséget várt Ottawától. De nem volt könnyű

⁴ Donaghy, Greg: „The Most Important Country in the World:” Escott Reid in India, 1952-57. In: Donaghy, Greg és Roussel, Stéphane 2004. *Escott Reid: Diplomat and Scholar*. McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal & Kingston, 67-84. o.

a dolga. A kabinet e kötetben közreadott vitaanyagaiból kiderül, a menekültek befogadásával kapcsolatban milyen kényes kérdéseket vetettek fel a föderális, illetve tartományi hatáskörök megosztásáról, és ezek milyen óvatosságra intették a minisztereket. A kanadai politikusokban kétségek merültek fel afelől, vajon a Vörös Kereszt képes-e felügyelni a kanadai segélyek célba juttatását, és emiatt nem akarták túl gyorsan növelni a támogatások mértékét. Mindezek ellenére a kormány végül eltörölte a bevándorlókkal szemben támasztott szokásos követelményeit és b) közben támogatta a magyarországi menekültek kanadai letelepedését. Ennek köszönhetően egy év leforgása alatt közel 30000 magyar talált otthonra Kanadában, és járult hozzá érezhetően az ország akkoriban kialakuló multikulturális arculatához.

* * *

Az olvasó által kezében tartott rövid kötet, mely a kanadai diplomácia és az 1956-os magyar forradalom kapcsolatát igyekszik bemutatni, a Kanada külkapcsolatairól évente megjelentetett külügyminisztériumi dokumentumgyűjtemény, a *Documents on Canadian External Relations* (franciául: *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada*) 23. kötetének részét képezi. A kanadai kormány külpolitikai és diplomáciai vonatkozású dokumentumainak alapvető forrásaként számon tartott sorozat első kötete 1967-ben látott napvilágot. Az azóta megjelent kötetek teljes részletességgel adnak számot Kanada legfontosabb külpolitikai döntéseiről, illetve ezek hátteréről. Az eddig kiadott 25 kötet az 1909-től (vagyis a minisztérium felállításának évétől) 1959-ig terjedő időszakot öleli fel. A sorozat részeként két különkiadás is napvilágot látott, az Új-Fundland Kanadai Államszövetséghez történő 1949-es csatlakozását megelőző 40 éves időszakról. A sorozat köteteiben ez idáig több mint 20 000 dokumentum kapott helyet, ami mintegy 35 000 oldalnyi szöveget és egy olyan nagy horderejű vállalkozást jelent, amely egyike a kanadai történelem legjelentősebb könyvkiadási projekteinek.⁵

Ezek a kötetek, amint a sorozat teljes egésze is, a korabeli kanadai külügyminisztérium és a miniszterelnöki kabinetiroda dossziéin alapulnak. Szükség esetén a források kiegészültek a miniszterek és magas rangú tisztviselők magánjellelű dokumentumaival, illetve a többi minisztérium archívumaival. A Kanada és a magyar forradalom kapcsolatát bemutató kötet előkészítése során szabadon tanulmányozhattam a külügyminisztérium valamennyi dossziéját és számos egyéb forrásból származó dokumentumgyűjteményt.

A további kutatások megkönnyítése céljából a forrás minden dokumentum jobb felső sarkában megtalálható. A nyomtatásban eddig meg nem jelent kanadai dokumentumokat egy kereszt (+) jelöli. A szerkesztő által kihagyott részeket három pont (...) jelzi. A „group corrupt” kifejezést azokon a helyeken használtuk, ahol gondot okozott az eredeti távirat szövegének kibetűzése. A szerző által törölt szavak és

⁵ Donaghy, Greg: Documenting the Diplomats: The Origins and Evolution of *Documents on Canadian External Relations*. *The Public Historian*, 25(1), (2003. tél) 9-28. o.

szövegrészletek, a lapszéli jegyzetek és a terjesztési listák csak azokban az esetben szerepelnek a dokumentumokban, lábjegyzetek formájában, ahol valamilyen jelentőséggel bírnak. Ha az ellenkezőjét külön nem jeleztük, feltételeztük, hogy a címzetek elolvasták a dokumentumokat. A tulajdon- és a földrajzi neveket normalizáltuk. A szerkeszt mindenfajta jelölés nélkül kijavította a helyesírási, központosítási és az átirásból adódó hibákat, amennyiben a szöveggörnyezethől egyértelműen kiderült az adott szövegrészlet értelme. Minden egyéb szerkesztői szövegbetoldást szögletes zárójel jelez. A dokumentumok nyelve angol vagy francia, attól függően, hogy az eredeti szöveg milyen nyelven fródott.

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OTTAWA, ONTARIO
2004. SZEPTEMBER

INTRODUCTION

En janvier 1956, il y a plus d'une dizaine d'années que les perspectives de paix et de sécurité n'ont pas été aussi bonnes en Europe. La mort de Staline, en 1953, la Conférence de Genève, en mai 1954, et la rencontre au sommet organisée dans cette même ville en 1955, où dirigeants soviétiques et occidentaux se réunissent pour la première fois depuis 1945, semblent annoncer un apaisement des tensions internationales. Toutefois, le Cabinet du premier ministre Louis Saint-Laurent n'en est pas convaincu, à telle enseigne que, à l'automne 1955, il envoie à Moscou le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures du Canada, Lester B. Pearson, avec pour mission de prendre le pouls de la situation. Le chef de la diplomatie canadienne apprécie sa rencontre animée avec le premier ministre soviétique, Nikita Khrouchtchev, dont il dira plus tard que seul un paysan ukrainien, devenu l'un des hommes les plus puissants du monde, pouvait faire montre à la fois d'une telle brusquerie et d'une telle impétuosité.¹ Pearson, qui envisage les choses dans une perspective libérale et réaliste, retourne à Ottawa en novembre 1955. Il affiche alors un optimisme prudent à l'égard de l'offre soviétique d'instaurer une « coexistence concurrentielle ».

En février 1956, lorsque Khrouchtchev dénonce Staline, lors du 20^e Congrès du Parti Communiste, cela contribue à renforcer la confiance du Canada dans les intentions de Moscou. « Il y a peu de doute que le mythe de Staline est en voie d'être complètement détruit, jubile Pearson. À présent, ajoute-t-il, le corps de Staline, comme le cadavre d'Oliver Cromwell, va probablement être pendu et écartelé. »² L'assouplissement de la politique soviétique et le vent de libéralisation qui souffle légèrement sur toute l'Europe de l'Est incitent les fonctionnaires du ministère des Affaires extérieures à revoir leur position à l'égard des pays satellites de la région. Robert Ford, chef de la Direction de l'Europe et plus grand spécialiste canadien des questions soviétiques, insiste pour que le gouvernement intensifie les échanges économiques, scientifiques et culturels avec ces pays. « Ces régimes ne seront pas renversés, écrit-il en juin 1956, de sorte qu'il vaudrait mieux nous attacher à les rendre plus acceptables à nos yeux. Il faut les encourager à se détacher de Moscou, tout en montrant clairement que nous n'avons aucune intention belliqueuse ni celle de modifier radicalement leurs régimes sociaux et politiques actuels. »³

Toutefois, les populations d'Europe de l'Est aspirent au changement, et souhaitent que celui-ci intervienne rapidement. C'est alors que, à l'automne 1956, les fonctionnaires canadiens sont pris de surprise par l'agitation populaire dont ils sont témoins et qui vient à bout des régimes communistes « nationalistes » de Pologne et de Hongrie. Les diplomates canadiens ne sont pas moins surpris, à la fin d'octobre, lorsque des émeutes d'intellectuels et d'étudiants hongrois forcent les troupes soviétiques à se retirer de Budapest. Au début, comme en témoignent les premiers documents du recueil, ils espèrent une action prompte des Nations Unies, susceptible de mettre un terme à la violence et de permettre au gouvernement du premier ministre Imre Nagy de trouver, avec Moscou, un compromis pacifique et d'instaurer un régime libéral.

¹ Bonn (de Pearson) à Ottawa, télégramme 237, 15 octobre 1955, *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada, Volume 21 : 1955*, sous la direction de Greg Donaghy (Ottawa : Groupe Communication Canada, 1999), p. 1167.

² L. B. Pearson, « Note à l'intention du premier ministre », 27 mars 1956, *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada, volume 23 : 1956-1957, Partie 2*, sous la direction de Greg Donaghy (Ottawa : Édition du gouvernement du Canada, 2002), p. 911.

³ Robert Ford, « Note à l'intention du chef de la Direction de l'Europe », 12 juin 1956, *ibid.*, p. 877.

INTRODUCTION

The prospects for peace and security in Europe seemed more hopeful in January 1956 than they had for more than a decade. Stalin's death in 1953, the Geneva Conference of May 1954, and the July 1955 summit in Geneva, where Soviet and Western leaders gathered for the first time since 1945, seemed to herald a period of reduced global tension. Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent's cabinet, however, was uncertain, and in the fall of 1955, it despatched Canada's secretary of state for external affairs, Lester B. Pearson, to Moscow to survey the situation. The foreign minister enjoyed his spirited encounter with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, whom he later described as being "as blunt and volatile as only a Ukrainian peasant, turned one of the most powerful men in the world, can be."¹ A liberal realist in outlook, Pearson returned to Ottawa in November 1955 cautiously optimistic about Soviet offers of "competitive co-existence."

Canadian confidence in Moscow's intentions was reinforced in early 1956, when Khrushchev denounced Stalin during the 20th Communist Party Congress in February 1956. "There can be little doubt that the myth of Stalin is being completely demolished," exulted Pearson, adding that "the body of Stalin – like that of Oliver Cromwell, is, post-mortem, likely to be hanged, drawn and quartered."² The relaxation of Soviet policy and the gentle winds of liberalization that rippled through Eastern Europe encouraged officials in the Department of External Affairs to revise their attitude toward the satellite states of Eastern Europe. Robert Ford, head of the European Division and Canada's foremost Soviet expert, urged the government to engage these states more actively in economic, scientific, and cultural exchanges. "The regimes are not going to be overthrown, so we had better concentrate our efforts on trying to make them more acceptable to us," he wrote in June 1956. "Our policy should be directed toward encouraging independence from Moscow while making it clear that we have no aggressive intentions and no intentions of radically altering their present social and political systems."³

East Europeans, however, wanted change, and they wanted it quickly. This surprised Canadian officials, who watched in amazement as popular unrest threw up "nationalist" Communist governments in Poland and Hungary by the fall of 1956. Canada's diplomats were equally astounded in late October, when rioting Hungarian intellectuals and students forced Soviet troops to retreat from Budapest. Initially, as the opening documents in this collection demonstrate, they hoped that a speedy intervention by the United Nations would end the violence and allow Premier Imre Nagy's government to work out a peaceful and liberal accommodation with Moscow.

This hope was dashed when Soviet troops and tanks re-entered the Hungarian capital a few days later, brutally crushing the poorly armed rebels and installing a puppet government. With only sketchy reports from Hungary, Pearson and his officials tried to make sense of what had happened. "The mistake of the rebels, and of Nagy for trying to keep pace with their demands," explained the under-secretary of

¹ Bonn (From Pearson) to Ottawa, Telegram 237, 15 October 1955, reprinted in Greg Donaghy (editor), *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 21: 1955* (Ottawa: Canadian Communication Group, 1999), p. 1167.

² L. B. Pearson, "Memorandum for the Prime Minister," 27 March 1956, reprinted in Greg Donaghy (editor), *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 23: 1956-57 Part II* (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing, 2002), p. 911.

³ Robert Ford, "Memorandum by Head, European Division," 12 June 1956, reprinted in *ibid.*, p. 877.

Cet espoir est déçu lorsque les soldats et les chars d'assaut soviétiques entrent de nouveau dans la capitale hongroise, quelques jours plus tard, puis répriment brutalement des rebelles mal armés et mettent en place un gouvernement fantoche. Ne recevant de Hongrie qu'une information incomplète, Pearson et ses fonctionnaires essaient de comprendre le fil des événements. « L'erreur des rebelles, et celle d'Imry Nagy, qui s'est efforcé d'accéder à leurs demandes, explique alors le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, Jules Léger, a été d'aller trop loin, trop vite. » [Document 12] Jules Léger estime, avec la même sévérité, que les pays occidentaux n'ont pas su réagir, les qualifiant de « complètement impassibles ». [Document 11] En fait, cela est encore plus accablant. Certes, il ne va pas jusqu'à affirmer que la reconquête de la Hongrie par les Soviétiques est le résultat de l'offensive franco-britannique pour reprendre le canal de Suez, le 29 octobre. Il croit néanmoins que, à la suite des mésaventures de deux des principaux membres de l'OTAN au Moyen-Orient, l'Occident s'est aliéné le bloc des pays afro-asiatiques aux Nations Unies, et que cela l'a empêché de tirer parti de l'indécision initiale de Moscou, à Budapest, afin de trouver une solution négociée au profit de la Hongrie.

Il est probable que le nombre de documents consacrés à la réaction de l'Inde aux événements intervenus en Hongrie étonne le lecteur. Cela n'est pas dû au hasard. Depuis la fin des années 1940, les décideurs canadiens s'attachent à courtiser ce pays et son premier ministre, le pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, considéré comme le chef des pays non alignés d'Afrique et d'Asie.¹ La révolution hongroise sert de banc d'essai à cette politique et fait ressortir ses insuffisances. L'Inde et ses alliés mettent en effet du temps à se rallier à la cause de la Hongrie à New York, source d'amertume et de trahison chez de nombreux fonctionnaires canadiens. « Je pense que nous devons reconnaître, concluait M. Ford, que la démarche des Nations Unies à l'égard de la Hongrie a été dans une large mesure un échec. (...) Les pays ont refusé obstinément d'entendre la seule leçon utile qu'aurait pu leur apprendre le groupe arabo-asiatique sur la nature du régime soviétique » [Document 55]

Bien qu'imparfaites, les mesures prises par le Canada face à l'afflux des réfugiés hongrois, qui essaient dans toute l'Europe à la suite de la crise, sont plus édifiantes que le détachement affiché aux Nations Unies. Grâce à son économie florissante d'après-guerre, axée sur les matières premières, le Canada est bien placé pour s'attaquer efficacement à ce problème, et Pearson veille à ce que le gouvernement apporte sa contribution. Animé à la fois par des objectifs idéologiques et humanitaires, le ministre des Affaires étrangères insiste pour qu'Ottawa fournisse une aide proportionnelle aux efforts déployés de toute part, à l'échelle nationale et internationale, pour aider les réfugiés. Toutefois, la partie est loin d'être gagnée. Les discussions au Cabinet, reproduites dans le présent recueil, montrent que l'accueil des réfugiés pose l'épineux problème des compétences fédérales et provinciales, qui force les ministres à se montrer prudents. Les responsables politiques mettent également en doute la capacité de la Croix-Rouge de veiller au bon acheminement de l'aide canadienne et, à ce titre, souhaitent ne pas l'augmenter trop rapidement. En tout état de cause, le gouvernement finit par lever la plupart des restrictions habituelles à l'immigration et subventionne largement la venue de réfugiés hongrois au Canada.

¹ « The Most Important Country in the World : » Escott Reid in India, 1952-57. » Greg Donaghy dans *Escott Reid : Diplomat and Scholar*, Greg Donaghy et Stéphane Roussel, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), p. 67-84.

state for external affairs, Jules Léger, "was in trying to go too far and too fast." [Document 12] But Léger was just as severe in judging the inadequate Western reaction, which he described as "completely impassive." [Document 11] Indeed, it was worse. Though Léger stopped short of blaming the Soviet reconquest of Hungary on the Anglo-French assault on the Suez Canal of October 29, he thought the Mideast misadventures of two of NATO's leading members had alienated the Afro-Asian bloc at the United Nations and cost the West a chance to exploit Moscow's early hesitations in Budapest to seek a negotiated solution favourable to Hungary.

Readers might be intrigued by the number of documents that focus on India's reaction to the events in Hungary. This was no accident. Since the late 1940s, Canadian policy-makers had made a sustained effort to court India and its prime minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the acknowledged leader of the non-aligned Afro-Asian bloc.⁴ The Hungarian Revolution tested this policy and found it wanting. India and its followers were slow to rally to the Hungarian cause in New York, leaving many Canadian officials feeling bitter and betrayed. "I think we must agree," concluded Ford, "that the action of the UN on Hungary was largely a failure. ... The one lesson that might profitably have been learned by the Arab-Asian group concerning the natures of the Soviet system has been obstinately refused." [Document 55]

Though imperfect, Canada's response to the flood of Hungarian refugees that spilled across Europe in the wake of the crisis was more inspiring than its detached posture at the United Nations. Here was a problem that Canada, with its booming postwar resource economy, could address effectively, and Pearson made sure the government contributed its share. Moved by a combination of ideological and humanitarian motives, the foreign minister insisted that Ottawa match the outpouring of domestic and international support for the refugees. But the going was tough. The Cabinet discussions reprinted in this collection show how the resettling of refugees raised tricky questions of federal-provincial responsibilities, making ministers cautious and wary. Canada's politicians also worried about the Red Cross's capacity to oversee Canadian aid and hesitated to increase it too quickly. Even so, the government eventually removed most of the usual immigration requirements and heavily subsidized the movement of Hungarian refugees to Canada. Within a year, almost 30,000 Hungarians had moved to Canada, where they made their presence felt in the country's emerging multicultural mosaic.

* * *

The documents in this small book on Canada and the Hungarian Revolution are extracted from Volume 23 of the series, *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, published annually by Foreign Affairs Canada. First issued in 1967, *Documents on Canadian External Relations* represents the basic published record of the foreign policy and foreign relations of the Government of Canada, and provides a comprehensive, self-contained record of the country's major foreign policy decisions

⁴ Greg Donaghy, "'The Most Important Country in the World': Escott Reid in India, 1952-57," in Greg Donaghy and Stéphane Roussel, *Escott Reid: Diplomat and Scholar* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), pp. 67-84.

C'est ainsi que, dans l'espace d'une année, près de 30 000 Hongrois émigrent au Canada, où ils occupent une place non négligeable dans le nouveau paysage multiculturel canadien.

* * *

Les documents publiés dans ce court recueil sur le Canada et la révolution hongroise sont extraits du *Volume 23* de la série *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada*, publiée annuellement par Affaires étrangères Canada. Parus pour la première fois en 1967, les *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada* se veulent un recueil des documents fondamentaux relatant la conduite de la politique et des relations étrangères du gouvernement du Canada. Ils rendent compte, de manière complète, des décisions de politique étrangère importantes prises par le Canada, et de leurs fondements. À ce jour, 25 volumes ont été publiés, pour la période allant de 1909, année de la création du ministère, à 1959. Deux volumes spéciaux sont également consacrés aux relations avec Terre-Neuve pendant les 40 années qui ont précédé son entrée dans la Confédération, en 1949. Jusqu'ici, plus de 20 000 documents ont été reproduits dans le cadre de cette série, ce qui représente environ 35 000 pages de texte et l'un des projets d'édition les plus importants jamais entrepris au Canada.⁵

Ces volumes, comme l'ensemble de la série, reposent surtout sur les dossiers de l'ancien ministère des Affaires extérieures et du Bureau du Conseil privé. Au besoin, ils ont été étoffés par des documents privés appartenant à des ministres du Cabinet et à des hauts fonctionnaires, ainsi que par les archives d'autres ministères. Pour ce volume, j'ai pu consulter librement tous les dossiers du ministère des Affaires étrangères et une bonne partie des autres collections d'archives.

Aux fins de recherches ultérieures, mentionnons que la source figure dans le coin supérieur droit de chaque document. Une croix (+) désigne un document canadien inédit. Les modifications rédactionnelles sont indiquées par une ellipse (...). L'expression « Group corrupt » signale des problèmes de déchiffrement dans la transmission du télégramme original. Les mots et les passages biffés par l'auteur, les notes marginales et les listes de distribution ne sont reproduits sous forme de renvois en bas de page que lorsqu'ils sont importants. Sauf indication contraire, on suppose que les documents ont été lus par leur destinataire. Les noms propres et géographiques ont été normalisés. L'éditeur a corrigé, sans l'indiquer, l'orthographe, la ponctuation et la mise en majuscules, ainsi que les erreurs de transcription, lorsque le contexte permettait de saisir facilement le sens du passage. Tous les autres ajouts rédactionnels apportés aux documents sont indiqués par des crochets. Les documents sont reproduits en français ou en anglais selon la langue utilisée dans l'original.

GREG DONAGHY
OTTAWA, ONTARIO
SEPTEMBRE 2004

⁵ « Documenting the Diplomats : The Origins and Evolution of *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, » Greg Donaghy, *The Public Historian*, volume 25, n° 1 (hiver 2003), p. 9 à 28.

and their underlying rationale. To date, the series totals twenty-five volumes, covering the period from 1909, when the department was established, to 1959. It also includes two special volumes on relations with Newfoundland in the two decades before it joined Canada in 1949. *Documents on Canadian External Relations* has reprinted over 20,000 documents so far, totalling almost 35,000 pages of text and making it one of the largest publishing projects in Canadian history.⁵

These volumes and this collection are based primarily on the records of Canada's foreign ministry, then known as the Department of External Affairs, and its cabinet secretariat, the Privy Council Office. These are supplemented where necessary by the private papers of Cabinet ministers and senior officials, as well as the files of other government departments. In preparing this selection of documents on Canada and the Hungarian Revolution, I was given complete access to the files of the Department of External Affairs and generous access to other collections.

To help readers wishing to do further research, the source is indicated at the upper right-hand corner of each document. The symbols are explained in the Location of Documents. A dagger (+) indicates a Canadian document that has not been printed. Editorial excisions are shown by an ellipse (...). The phrase "group corrupt" indicates decryption problems in the transmission of the original telegram. Words and passages that were struck out by the author, marginal notes and distribution lists are reproduced as footnotes only when important. Unless otherwise indicated, it is assumed that documents have been read by the addressee. Proper and place names are standardized. The editor has silently corrected spelling, punctuation and capitalization, as well as transcription errors whose meaning is clear from their context. All other editorial additions to the documents are indicated by the use of square brackets. Documents are reprinted in either English or French, depending on their language of origin.

GREG DONAGHY
OTTAWA, ONTARIO
SEPTEMBER 2004

⁵ Greg Donaghy, "Documenting the Diplomats: The Origins and Evolution of *Documents on Canadian External Relations*," *The Public Historian*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Winter 2003), pp. 9-28.

PROVENANCE DES DOCUMENTS
LOCATION OF DOCUMENTS

Dossiers du ministère de la
Citoyenneté et de l'Immigration
Bibliothèque et Archives Canada

DCI

Department of Citizenship and
Immigration Files,
Library and Archives Canada (RG 26)

Dossiers du ministère
des Affaires extérieures,
Bibliothèque et Archives Canada

DEA

Department of External
Affairs Files, Library and Archives
Canada (RG 25)

Documents de Escott Reid,
Bibliothèque et Archives Canada

E.R.

Escott Reid Papers,
Library and Archives Canada (MG 31)

Bureau du Conseil privé—
conclusions du Cabinet et
documents du Cabinet.
Bibliothèque et Archives Canada

PCO

Privy Council Office—
Cabinet Conclusions and
Cabinet Documents,
Library and Archives Canada (RG 2)

LISTE DES ABBRÉVIATIONS LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Cab Doc	CABINET DOCUMENT
CBC-IS	CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION—INTERNATIONAL SERVICE
DCI	DEPARTMENT OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
DEA	DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
FAO	FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION
ICEM	INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR EUROPEAN MIGRATION
ICRC	INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS
NATO	NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
PCO	PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE
PEI	PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND
TB	TUBERCULOSIS
UK	UNITED KINGDOM
UN	UNITED NATIONS
UNESCO	UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION
USA	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
USSR	UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

LISTE DES PERSONNALITÉS LIST OF PERSONS

- | | |
|--|---|
| BULGANIN, N.A., PRÉSIDENT, CONSEIL DES MINISTRES DE L'UNION SOVIÉTIQUE | BULGANIN, N.A., CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF SOVIET UNION |
| CHUVAHIN, D.S., AMBASSADEUR DE L'UNION SOVIÉTIQUE | CHUHAVIN, D.S., AMBASSADOR OF SOVIET UNION |
| DIXON, SIR PIERSON, REPRÉSENTANT PERMANENT DU ROYAUME-UNI AUPRÈS DES NATIONS UNIES | DIXON, SIR PIERSON, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF UNITED KINGDOM TO UNITED NATIONS |
| DOUGLAS, TOMMY C., PREMIER MINISTRE DU SASKATCHEWAN | DOUGLAS, TOMMY C., PREMIER OF SASKATCHEWAN |
| DUTT, SUBIMAL, SECRÉTAIRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES, MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES DE L'INDE | DUTT, SUBIMAL, FOREIGN SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OF INDIA |
| FORD, R.A.D., CHEF, DIRECTION EUROPÉENNE (-MARS, 1957); AMBASSADEUR EN COLOMBIE | FORD, R.A.D., HEAD, EUROPEAN DIVISION (-MAR, 1957); AMBASSADOR IN COLOMBIA |
| GOMULKA, WLADYSLAW, PREMIER SECRÉTAIRE DU COMITÉ CENTRAL DU PARTI OUVRIER UNIFIÉ (COMMUNISTE) DE POLOGNE (OCT. 1956) | GOMULKA, WLADYSLAW, FIRST SECRETARY OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE, UNITED WORKERS PARTY (COMMUNIST) OF POLAND (OCT. 1956-) |
| GUIRINGAUD, LOUIS DE, CHEF ADJOINT, MISSION PERMANENTE DE FRANCE AUPRÈS DES NATIONS UNIES | GUIRINGAUD, LOUIS DE, ASSISTANT HEAD, PERMANENT MISSION OF FRANCE TO UNITED NATIONS |
| HARRIS, WALTER E., MINISTRE DES FINANCES | HARRIS, WALTER E., MINISTER OF FINANCE |
| HOLMES, JOHN W., SOUS-SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT ADJOINT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES | HOLMES, JOHN W., ASSISTANT UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS |
| HORTHY, MIKLÓS, RÉGENT DE HONGRIE DE 1920 À 1944 | HORTHY, MIKLÓS, REGENT OF HUNGARY (1920-1944) |
| HORVATH, IMRE, MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES DE HONGRIE | HORVATH, IMRE, FOREIGN MINISTER OF HUNGARY |
| JOHNSON, DAVID M., AMBASSADEUR EN UNION SOVIÉTIQUE | JOHNSON, DAVID M., AMBASSADOR IN SOVIET UNION |
| KÁDÁR, JÁNOS, PREMIER MINISTRE DE HONGRIE (NOV. 1956 -) | KÁDÁR, JÁNOS, PRIME MINISTER OF HUNGARY (NOV. 1956 -) |
| KHROUCHCHEV, N.S., PREMIER SECRÉTAIRE DU COMITÉ CENTRAL DU PARTI COMMUNISTE DE L'UNION SOVIÉTIQUE | KHRUSHCHEV, N.S., FIRST SECRETARY OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF COMMUNIST PARTY OF SOVIET UNION |
| LÉGER, JULES, SOUS-SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES | LÉGER, JULES, UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS |
| LINDT, AUGUSTE RUDOLPH, HAUT-COMMISSAIRE POUR LES RÉFUGIÉS | LINDT, AUGUSTE RUDOLPH, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES |
| LODGE, HENRY CABOT, JR., REPRÉSENTANT PERMANENT DES ÉTATS-UNIS AUPRÈS DES NATIONS UNIES | LODGE, HENRY CABOT, JR., PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF UNITED STATES TO UNITED NATIONS |
| MACKAY, R.A., REPRÉSENTANT PERMANENT AUPRÈS DES NATIONS UNIES | MACKAY, R.A., PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO UNITED NATIONS |
| MENON, V.K. KRISHNA, MINISTRE SANS PORTEFEUILLE DE L'INDE (- DÉC. 1956), ET PRÉSIDENT, DÉLÉGATION DE L'INDE À L'ASSEMBLÉE GÉNÉRALE DES NATIONS UNIES; MINISTRE DE LA DÉFENSE | MENON, V.K. KRISHNA, MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO OF INDIA (-DEC. 1956) AND CHAIRMAN OF INDIAN DELEGATION TO UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY; MINISTER OF DEFENCE |

- MUNRO, SIR LESLIE, AMBASSADEUR DE NOUVELLE-ZÉLANDE AUX ÉTATS-UNIS ET REPRÉSENTANT PERMANENT AUPRÈS DES NATIONS UNIES
- NAGY, IMRE, PREMIER MINISTRE DE HONGRIE (OCT.-NOV. 1956)
- NEHRU, PANDIT JAWAHARLAL, PREMIER MINISTRE DE L'INDE
- PEARSON, LESTER B., SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES
- PICKERSGILL, J.W., MINISTRE DE LA CITOYENNETÉ ET DE L'IMMIGRATION
- PILLAI, SIR R.N., SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL DU MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES DE L'INDE
- RAIK, LASZLO, CHEF COMMUNISTE HONGROIS EXÉCUTÉ POUR ESPIONAGE EN 1949 ET REHABILITÉ EN 1956
- REID, ESCOTT, HAUT-COMMISSAIRE EN INDE
- ROBERTSON, NORMAN, HAUT-COMMISSAIRE AU ROYAUME-UNI
- SAINTE-LAURENT, LOUIS S., PREMIER MINISTRE
- SHEPILOV, DMITRI TROFIMOVICH, MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES DE L'UNION SOVIÉTIQUE (- FÉV.1957) -
- STALIN, JOSEF, SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL, PARTI COMMUNISTE DE L'UNION SOVIÉTIQUE (MORT MARS 1953)
- STANBURY, DR. WILLIAM STUART, COMMISSAIRE NATIONAL, SOCIÉTÉ CANADIENNE DE LA CROIX-ROUGE
- VOIR SAINT-LAURENT
- TITO, MARÉCHAL JOSIP BROZ, PRÉSIDENT DE YOUGOSLAVIE
- ZHARKOV, ALEKSEI, VICE-MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES DE L'UNION SOVIÉTIQUE
- ZHUKOV, MARÉCHAL GEORGI K., CANDIDAT À PRAESIDIUM DU SOVIET SUPRÊME DE L'UNION SOVIÉTIQUE ET MINISTRE DE LA DÉFENSE.
- MUNRO, SIR LESLIE, AMBASSADOR OF NEW ZEALAND IN UNITED STATES AND PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO UNITED NATIONS
- NAGY, IMRE, PRIME MINISTER OF HUNGARY (OCT.-NOV. 1956)
- NEHRU, PANDIT JAWAHARLAL, PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA
- PEARSON, LESTER B., SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
- PICKERSGILL, J.W., MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
- PILLAI, SIR R.N., SECRETARY-GENERAL, MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OF INDIA
- RAIK, LASZLO, HUNGARIAN COMMUNIST LEADER, EXECUTED FOR ESPIONAGE IN 1949 AND REHABILITATED IN 1956
- REID, ESCOTT, HIGH COMMISSIONER IN INDIA
- ROBERTSON, NORMAN, HIGH COMMISSIONER IN UNITED KINGDOM
- SEE ST-LAURENT
- SHEPILOV, DMITRI TROFIMOVICH, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF SOVIET UNION (-FEB. 1957)
- STALIN, JOSEF, GENERAL SECRETARY, COMMUNIST PARTY OF SOVIET UNION (DIED MAR. 1953)
- STANBURY, DR. WILLIAM STUART, NATIONAL COMMISSIONER, CANADIAN RED CROSS SOCIETY
- ST-LAURENT, LOUIS S., PRIME MINISTER
- TITO, MARSHAL JOSIP BROZ, PRESIDENT OF YUGOSLAVIA.
- ZHARKOV, ALEKSEI, VICE-MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF SOVIET UNION
- ZHUKOV, MARSHAL GEORGI K., CANDIDATE MEMBER OF PRAESIDIUM OF SUPREME SOVIET OF SOVIET KINGDOM AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE

LA DIPLOMATIE CANADIENNE PENDANT
LA RÉVOLUTION HONGROISE
CANADIAN DIPLOMACY AND
THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION

1.

DEA/8619-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au haut-commissaire au Royaume Uni*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs
to High Commissioner in United Kingdom*

TELEGRAM SS-220

Ottawa, October 26, 1956

CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.

Repeat Paris, Washington, New Delhi, Canberra, Belgrade, Pretoria, Wellington.
(Immediate).

Repeat New York (Information).

HUNGARIAN SITUATION AND THE U.N.

1. As State Department has unfortunately already announced, USA has consulted us and others about feasibility of taking Hungarian situation to United Nations. USA Minister asked us this morning for our reactions to two possible courses of action which might be taken collectively by as many of the signatories of the Hungarian peace treaty as wish to do so:

(a) A letter might be sent to Security Council to invite attention to situation created in Hungary by employment of Soviet forces against Hungarian people to repress demands to enjoy human rights and freedom affirmed in Charter and guaranteed by peace treaty; letter would urge Council members to keep situation under review to determine whether it is liable to endanger peace and security, and if so what constructive steps Council might take;

(b) Alternatively Security Council resolution could be submitted provided for establishment of committee to determine facts and report results of findings to the Council.

2. We are interested in this idea especially if India and Yugoslavia take an active part and would see some advantages in inviting USSR to join in sponsoring this or amended proposal although they would probably reject it. If they did by any chance accept, it might provide only foreseeable context in which Hungarian leaders could talk officially to the West.

3. In any case we would hope U.N. action might facilitate an end to the fighting on terms which would be better than mere repression of anti-Soviet rioters. Rebels are reported this morning to have appealed to U.K. (and perhaps others) to take Security Council action. In circumstances a letter to Security Council is probably all Western group of peace treaty signatories can do. However, if USSR would participate fact finding committee might have more than propaganda value.

4. Grateful for your comments and (except for Washington) those of your Foreign Office on USA suggestion.

5. (Belgrade only) Your USA colleague has authority to approach Yugoslav government at his discretion but may have decided not repeat not to do so.

[L.B.] PEARSON

2.

DEA/8619-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au haut-commissaire au Royaume-Uni
Secretary of State for External Affairs
to High Commissioner in United Kingdom*

TELEGRAM SS-222

Ottawa, October 29, 1956

CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.

Repeat Paris, Washington, New Delhi, Canberra, Belgrade, Pretoria, Wellington. (Immediate).

HUNGARIAN SITUATION AND THE U.N.

Following is the text of the letter¹ addressed today by our Permanent Representative in New York to the Secretary General of the UN. Text begins. In accordance with instructions from my government, I have the honour to inform you that the Government of Canada fully approves of the initiative taken by the Governments of France, the UK and the US in requesting on October 27/56 that the Security Council should concern itself urgently with the situation in Hungary arising out of foreign armed intervention. In this connection I should like to draw your attention to a statement made on October 27 by the Honourable L.B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, a copy of which is annexed. Text ends.

2. Following is the relevant portion of the Minister's speech on Saturday communicated by Dr. MacKay to the Secretary General. Text begins. The view of the Canadian Government is that the United Nations should immediately be seized of the Hungarian situation in order to prevent further bloodshed and to enable Hungary freely to choose its own course as a new member of the United Nations.

3. It will be the duty and the responsibility of the Soviet Union as well as any other member of the United Nations to work towards such a solution.

4. The forces of world opinion must be mobilized in favour of the forces of national freedom in these countries and against foreign armed intervention and foreign domination. The United Nations is where this should be and can be done. Text ends.

5. Please inform the Government to which you are accredited.

¹ Cette lettre a été demandée par des « junior officers » de la mission des États-Unis auprès des Nations Unies le 28 octobre. Mackay a discuté de l'approche des États-Unis avec Léger au téléphone. New York à Ottawa, télégramme 1037, 29 octobre 1956, MAE dossier 8619-40.

This letter was solicited by "junior officers" of the United States U.N. mission on October 28. MacKay discussed the American approach by telephone with Léger. New York to Ottawa, Tel 1037, October 29, 1956, DEA file 8619-40.

3.

DE:A/8619-40

*Le haut-commissaire au Royaume Uni
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*
*High Commissioner in United Kingdom
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1484

London, October 30, 1956

SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

Repeat Washington, Permex New York, Paris, NATO Paris (Information),
By Bag Warsaw, Belgrade, Prague, Moscow.

SITUATION IN HUNGARY

We had a discussion this morning with Brimelow, Head of the Foreign Office Northern Department, about recent developments in Hungary. Brimelow is more than ever impressed with the contrast between Nagy and Gomulka. Reports from the UK Legation in Budapest, which the Foreign Office fully accept, suggest that Nagy's own position has become increasingly, and is now perhaps almost exclusively, dependent on the support of Russian armed forces. Brimelow suggested that if these forces were really withdrawn Nagy and his government might well be lynched. He expects that the Russians will continue to try to shore Nagy up, mainly by armed force, but thinks the Russians probably under-estimate the political difficulties of this.

2. According to UK reports the overwhelming majority of Hungarians have rejected not merely Russian domination but also communism itself. The UK Legation in Budapest seems to have little, if any, confidence in Nagy's honesty, and reports that his government have repeatedly tried to trick the nationalists into surrendering by false reports of surrenders and of the conclusion of truce agreements.

3. The picture of last week's events is now somewhat clarified. Apparently it was the Hungarian security police which started shooting at the beginning and thereby turned the demonstrations into a popular uprising. By now, according to the British Legation, virtually all Hungarians excepting top communists and the security police, but including some of the latter, are bitterly anti-Russian and pro-nationalist.

4. Nagy's efforts to broaden his government have been largely unsuccessful. The UK Legation are skeptical about the extent to which Bela Kovacs is in fact voluntarily participating in the new government. Apparently Nagy did carry out negotiations with "genuine social democrats" for a real coalition government but these broke down because the social democrats stood firm on the conditions of free elections and the withdrawal of Russian troops.

5. The Nagy Government is, however, going to great lengths in its efforts to get some nationalist support. Thus the Prime Minister is reported to have stated in a broadcast that "a great national movement has taken shape of which the government approves". Moreover in an article entitled "A Reply to Pravda", the Hungarian Communist Party Organ *Szabad Nep*, specifically says that "What happened was not anti-democratic, was not an adventure and did not collapse" and states that "The tragic yet uplifting struggle has not been the outcome of some undermining activity but alas had been brought about by our own errors and crimes, primarily by our failing to protect the sacred flame inherited from

our ancestors — that is our national independence". This paper puts the blame explicitly on "the criminal clique of Gero".

6. The British Legation reported that Mikoyan arrived in Budapest on Saturday.

7. Both the USA and the UK representatives in Hungary took the early initiative of urging that their governments take action in the UN. The British representative, though he apparently started with a rather more cautious view than his American colleague, has during the past few days come to attach very great importance to action or statements which would encourage the Hungarian nationalists, who seem to have surprised everyone by showing some prospect of winning out in the end.

8. When we saw Brimelow this morning no decision had been taken about the instructions to be sent to Sir Pierson Dixon at the UN, where the Hungarian situation is expected to be discussed tomorrow, Wednesday October 31. As you will appreciate there was some confusion and uncertainty in view of the overnight developments in the Middle East. In New York Lodge had apparently suggested introducing a draft substantive resolution on Hungary asking that Russian troops be withdrawn, but it was recognised that this would almost certainly invoke a Soviet veto, and might also conceivably create an awkward precedent for other areas. Its legal basis might also be complicated in view of the Warsaw Treaty. The Foreign Office officials were inclined to approve an alternative suggestion of Pierson Dixon's that a good first stage in the Security Council might be to introduce a procedural resolution taking note of Nagy's public promise to ask the Russians to withdraw their troops from all of Hungary, and deciding to leave the question on the agenda to see how these negotiations come out. This, it is thought, might give an opportunity for non-Communist representatives to make helpful statements on the record while avoiding a Soviet veto and yet taking some formal action to pin Nagy down and to encourage the liberalization processes in Hungary. In any case, however, in view of the importance of speed and of agreement of the USA and France the widest discretion will almost certainly be left to the missions in New York.

[N.A.] ROBERTSON

*Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet**Extract from Cabinet Conclusions*

SECRET

[Ottawa], October 31, 1956

Present

The Prime Minister (Mr. St-Laurent) in the Chair.
 The Minister of National Health and Welfare (Mr. Martin).
 The Minister of Labour (Mr. Gregg).
 The Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson).
 The Minister of Justice (Mr. Garson).
 The Minister of Public Works (Mr. Winters).
 The Minister of Veterans Affairs and Postmaster General (Mr. Lapointe).
 The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Campney).
 The Leader of the Government in the Senate and Solicitor General (Senator Macdonald).
 The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Mr. Pickersgill).
 The Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources (Mr. Lesage).
 The Minister of Transport (Mr. Marler).
 The Secretary of State (Mr. Pinard).
 The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Bryce).
 The Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Martin).

HUNGARY; SERVICE OF CANADIANS IN HUNGARIAN FORCES;
 FOREIGN ENLISTMENT ACT

1. *The Secretary of State for External Affairs* said there had been a number of requests from persons of Hungarian extraction for information on the possibility of going to Hungary to fight against the Russians. Under the Foreign Enlistment Act, passed in 1937, it was an offence for a Canadian to enlist in the forces of a foreign state at war with a friendly nation. It was not an offence to take part in a civil conflict in another country unless an order in council were passed under that statute, specifically prohibiting it. The minister had said no such order had been passed in regard to this Hungarian war nor was one contemplated. Legally, therefore, Canadians could go to Hungary to join the Hungarian liberation forces. Of course, persons with Hungarian citizenship might have difficulty returning to Canada, and even people of Hungarian origin with Canadian citizenship might also find it difficult to travel without a passport.

The number of requests would probably slacken off as the Russians withdrew from Hungary. Meanwhile, it was proposed to explain the legal situation and to mention that it was not proposed to pass the type of order referred to above.

2. *The Cabinet* noted the report of the Secretary of State for External Affairs on the legal position with regard to persons in Canada joining the liberation forces in Hungary.

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au haut-commissaire au Royaume-Uni*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs
to High Commissioner in United Kingdom*

TELEGRAM SS 227

Ottawa, October 31, 1956

CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.

Reference: Our telegram No. SS-220 October 26 and your telegram 1484 October 30.
Repeat Washington, Paris, Permex New York (Immediate).
Repeat NATO Paris (Information).

HUNGARIAN SITUATION AND THE U.N.

Our two aims in supporting the discussion of this question in the U.N. were to put an end to the bloodshed and to try to reach a satisfactory solution. From reports reaching us the first seems to have been accomplished, at least temporarily, and it may be that the Hungarians themselves can work out a satisfactory arrangement for the future government of their country. Latest reports of the changing Soviet attitude towards the satellites indeed are so encouraging, it seems to me that it may be advisable, in the circumstances, to postpone further discussion of this question in the Security Council until the situation becomes a little more clear, and certainly until the new Hungarian Delegation reaches New York.² It may well be in any case that Middle East developments will prevent early discussion in any event. I hope when discussion is resumed that the Western Powers can avoid the temptation to score a propaganda victory over the Russians. Depending on the course of events a good first stage could well be that suggested to you by the Foreign Office.

2. To London only: Could you please outline these views to the Foreign Office.

To Washington and Paris only: Please discuss with the State Department (Quai d'Orsay) along these lines.

To New York only: It would be useful to discuss this with your UK, French, US and Australian colleagues.

[J.] LÉGER

² Dans une importante déclaration publiée le 30 octobre 1956, l'Union soviétique a annoncé qu'elle avait l'intention de réviser ses relations avec les États socialistes de l'Europe de l'Est « so as to remove any possibility of violation of the principle of national sovereignty, mutual benefit and equality in economic relations. » Pour la déclaration, voir *Documents on International Relations, 1956*, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs - Oxford University Press, 1959, pp. 465-468.

In an important declaration issued on 30 October 1956, the Soviet Union announced its willingness to conduct a searching re-examination of its relations with the socialist states of Eastern Europe "so as to remove any possibility of violation of the principle of national sovereignty, mutual benefit and equality in economic relations." For the declaration, see *Documents on International Relations, 1956*, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs - Oxford University Press, 1959, pp. 465-468.

6.

E.R./Vol. 8

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au haut-commissaire en Inde*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs
to High Commissioner in India*

TELEGRAM M-604

Ottawa, October 31, 1956

SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

Repeat London, Paris, Washington, Permisis New York (Information).

A press despatch just received carries the story of Indian condemnation of the Israeli attack on Egypt. I have no quarrel with the Indian Government's decision in this matter but the contrast between its quick and strong denunciation of Israeli action with its complete silence over events in Hungary, and Russian intervention in these events, will have a very bad effect in this country.

L.B. PEARSON

7.

DEA/8619-40

*Le haut commissaire en Inde
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in India
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 642

New Delhi, November 1, 1956

SECRET. IMPORTANT.

Reference: Your telegram [M604] October 31.

INDIA'S SILENCE OVER HUNGARY

I saw Pillai at noon November 1. I began by saying that when I had requested this interview a few days ago it was to give him a memorandum on the Hungarian situation and the UN. I then gave him this memorandum which embodied the text of the documents given in your telegram SS-222 October 29. I went on to say that when we had seen Dutt on October 30 on the question of the Indo-Canadian immigration agreement he had asked me to stay on for a few minutes alone. He had then expressed India's concern over the newspaper reports of the Israeli invasion of Egypt.

2. At that time I had said to Dutt speaking personally that he had no doubt seen that there was already criticism in North America over the silence of Nehru over Hungary. It was impossible to conceive of any situation affecting a Western power which would parallel that which had arisen in Hungary. Suppose however there had been a popular revolution in Spain against Franco and USA troops had at Franco's request participated in quelling the revolution. I was sure that if that had occurred there would have been an outcry in the Indian press.

3. I said to Pillai that not repeat not only had there been silence by Nehru over Soviet armed intervention in Hungary but there had been a statement by Krishna Menon on October 28 that developments in Hungary were internal matters for the Hungarian people.

4. My fear that Indian silence on the Hungarian situation would cause criticism in North America had been confirmed by the message that I had received this morning from you. I then read your message making clear that I had not repeat not been instructed to transmit it to him but that I felt that he ought to have it. I said that I would draw to your attention the fact that there had been no repeat no separate Indian condemnation on the Israeli attack on Egypt and that you must be referring to the statement of the official Indian spokesman on October 31 condemning the Israeli attack on Egypt and the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt.

5. Pillai at first took strong exception to my remarks. There was no repeat no parallel between what was happening in Egypt and what had happened in Hungary. Because of the Warsaw Pact and the request by the Hungarian government for Soviet assistance in quelling the revolution a cloak of legality had been cast over the Soviet action. I replied that that cloak had been cast aside when Nagy had denied that the Hungarian government had requested Soviet intervention. Pillai said that if Canada criticized India for not repeat not having come out strongly on Soviet action in Hungary he might similarly criticize Canada for not repeat not having yet issued a strong public denunciation of the aggression of Israel, France and the UK against Egypt.

6. I said I would not repeat not have spoken to him about your message to me if the question was one of recrimination. The discussion of the question of Hungary was however still pending before the Security Council. Would it not repeat not be possible for Nehru in the course of the next few days to make his position clear. The people of Hungary had put on one of the most gallant demonstrations of courage which the world had seen in many years. They had been fighting for national freedom against foreign domination. I could if I wanted to quote statements made by Nehru during the course of the Indian struggle for freedom which could be applied unchanged to the Hungarian struggle.

7. Pillai said that I was the only diplomatic representative here who had expressed to him criticism of Indian inaction in relation to Soviet aggression in Hungary. The Prime Minister's time was so occupied that it would be impossible for Pillai to speak to him about what I had said. We felt that if he were to report in a memorandum it would have an unfortunate effect. He suggested that the next time a convenient opportunity arose when I was talking to Nehru I might raise the matter with him delicately perhaps not repeat not in reference to Hungary but in reference to what might happen in another country e.g. Roumania.

8. I had hoped that by raising this issue I might evoke from Pillai the reply that though India had remained silent in public it had brought pressure to bear on the USSR through diplomatic channels. Unfortunately no repeat no such approach was made to the USSR. The only action which the Prime Minister did take to show his sympathy for the revolutionaries in Hungary was to give orders that the telegrams which he had received from Hungarian emigrés imploring his assistance should be published since he wanted the people of India to know that he was in touch with these emigrés.

9. From my experience in the past in dealing with Pillai I think that what I have said to him of your views may encourage him to urge Nehru if not repeat not to say something about Hungary soon at least to speak quickly if another situation on the Hungarian pattern arises.

10. I should be glad to know if you wish me to pursue the matter with Nehru the next time I see him.

[E.] REID

8.

DEA/8619-40

*Le représentant permanent auprès des Nations Unies
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Permanent Representative to United Nations
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1084

New York, November 2, 1956

CONFIDENTIAL

Repeat London, Washington, NATO Paris, Paris (Information).

HUNGARIAN SITUATION

Under present plans there will be a Security Council meeting on the Hungarian situation at five pm today called at the request of UK, USA and France. A resolution will be presented and the USSR is expected to veto it. The USA will then move that the question be considered by the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution.

2. According to the UK delegation it is most unlikely that the General Assembly would meet on this item today. It is expected however that it will meet to take this up tomorrow assuming that the procedure in the Council goes as expected.

3. The USA, UK and French delegations have not yet agreed on the draft resolution to be introduced in the Council. They are meeting at three pm and we shall forward this resolution to be introduced later in the Assembly.

4. Apparently no new Hungarian representative has presented his credentials although there are confused stories to the effect that a new Hungarian representative may be available by the time the meeting is called.

9.

DEA/8619-40

*Le représentant permanent auprès des Nations Unies
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Permanent Representative to United Nations
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1089

New York, November 3, 1956

SECRET, IMMEDIATE

Repeat London, Washington, Paris, NATO Paris (Information).

SITUATION IN HUNGARY

Our telegrams yesterday may have given the impression that the USA, the UK and France were in agreement on the tactics and purposes of the treatment of the Hungarian item. Our info now, confirmed by the statements and attitudes taken at yesterday's Security Council meeting, is that only the UK and France were actively seeking a Soviet veto in order to have a General Assembly meeting on the Hungarian question. The USA was apparently determined to proceed more cautiously, to await clarification of the situation in Hungary, and was not prepared to rush a resolution into the Security Council designed chiefly to reap a Soviet veto. Statements made by both Dixon and Guiringaud in the

Council yesterday were much more sharply anti-Soviet than Lodge's statement. The keynote of Lodge's statement was his assertion that "We must now get all the facts so that whatever we do will be done in a sure-footed way and will be really helpful." Guiringaud on the other hand said his government had instructed him "To ask for an urgent meeting of the Security Council so that the Council may adopt an appropriate resolution. If that resolution were to prove impossible of achievement because of a veto we would have to envisage the immediate convening of a meeting of the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly."

2. In the course of the meeting the Hungarian Permanent Mission in New York, whose First Secretary had been allowed to sit but not speak at the meeting, circulated a note to the Secretary-General transmitting a further letter dated November 2 from Nagy to the effect that large Soviet military units had crossed the border of the country marching toward Budapest. The text of the letters from Nagy of November 1 and November 2 to the Secretary-General are given in a following telegram.³

3. The Council adjourned until 3.00 p.m. today. We have learned from the USA delegation that a resolution has been approved in Washington which is not as strong as the UK and France would want it. The USA is now prepared to put this resolution forward by itself if it cannot get UK and French agreement. The USA hope that the resolution would not come to a vote today so that the situation created by a probable Soviet veto can be delayed. In some circumstances they would be prepared to transfer this question to the Assembly but "the present circumstances are not the right ones". Their concern is no doubt partly the desire to have all the facts and not to take hasty action on Hungary but also, we believe, a desire to keep the emergency session of the General Assembly free of other issues until it has dealt fully with the Middle East crisis.

4. The UK and French delegations on the other hand are still pressing for the early moving of a resolution calculated to get a veto followed by immediate action to take the question up in the Assembly.

10.

DEA/8619-40

*Projet de note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
pour le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Draft Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, November 3, 1956

SITUATION IN HUNGARY

The information from Hungary is contradictory and confusing. We are dependent almost entirely on newspaper reports, and I understand that even the missions in Budapest itself can only get a partial idea of the situation. Nevertheless, the following preliminary comments on what is happening there might be of use over the weekend.

³ Pour les notes de Nagy, voir Nations Unies, Assemblée générale, *Documents officiels, deuxième session extraordinaire d'urgence, Annexe*, document A/3251, p. 1 et Nations Unies, Conseil de sécurité, *Documents officiels, onzième année, Supplément d'octobre, novembre et décembre 1956*, document S/3726, pp. 119 à 120.

For the Nagy notes, see United Nations, General Assembly, *Official Records, Second Emergency Special Session, Annex*, Document A/3251, p. 1 and United Nations, Security Council, *Official Records, Eleventh Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1956*, Document S/3726, pp. 119-120.

2. There seems to be little doubt that the Soviet troops, under pressure from the almost universal revolt against Soviet domination, did withdraw from Budapest. The entire Hungarian army and air force went over to the rebels and only remnants of the secret police sided with the Russians. The present government is a coalition, still headed by Nagy. The old Communist Party of Hungary has been dissolved and reformed as the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party of which Janos Kadar, the closest equivalent to a Hungarian Tito, is First Secretary. Four other parties are now represented in the government. The most important are the Smallholders Party and the Social Democratic Party. Public pressure is continuing for the resignation of three former Stalinists from the key portfolios of the Interior, Iron and Steel, and Coal and Electricity.

3. It is still uncertain how much prestige or authority this government has, since revolutionary committees, both civilian and military, appear to have been set up in other cities of Hungary, and their aims and ideas concerning tactics vary enormously. The main thing they all seem to have in common is their violent anti-Russian and anti-Communist feeling.

4. With regard to the military situation, it is reported that Soviet armoured columns have entered from the U.S.S.R. and Roumania. Our military intelligence estimates Soviet strength in Hungary has increased to at least three divisions. Armoured columns have closed off the Austro-Hungarian border and telephone communications between Vienna and Budapest appear to have been cut. The main airports, railways and highways are said to be controlled by Soviet forces.

5. Radio Budapest has announced that the Hungarian government has communicated three notes to the Soviet Ambassador in Hungary concerning a protest about the entry of new Soviet troops into the country; the immediate withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Hungary; and the commencement of immediate negotiations to determine the relations between the U.S.S.R. and Hungary on the basis of equality and independence.

6. Nagy has also sent a message to the United Nations Security Council announcing Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and Hungary's permanent neutrality, calling on the United Nations for support. Our information is that the Warsaw Pact has no provision for withdrawal of any State before the expiration of the twenty year period under which it is valid. We have not yet secured the text of the resolution which the United States delegation intends to submit to the Security Council.

7. The vacillation of the Soviet authorities over the Hungarian situation are due, in my opinion, to the following factors:

(a) The speed with which the Titoist movement in Hungary spread into a violent anti-Russian and anti Communist revolt;

(b) Probable divisions of opinion in Moscow as to the course of action to be followed by the U.S.S.R.:

(c) The diversion caused by the Suez crisis, giving time and excuse for the Soviet leaders to return to a policy of force in Hungary;

(d) The strongly anti-Soviet attitude adopted by the Hungarian government, probably under strong popular pressure;

(e) Fear of western intervention in Hungary, accentuated by the willingness of the British and French to risk war by actually attacking an important member of the United Nations.

8. Our latest reports are that the Russians have commenced negotiations with the Hungarians in Budapest. We have no more information than that, but I would suspect that the Russians will now demand as a minimum the stationing of Soviet troops in Hungary and the formation of a government which maintains at least the pretence of being partially

Communist. The Anglo-French defiance of the United Nations presumably will make them feel in a stronger position to resist United Nations demands and to insist with the Hungarians on a measure of Soviet control. In my view, one of the most disastrous consequences of the Middle East adventure is the excuse now given to the Russians to regain at least partial control of their satellites. The whole aim of NATO and the Western Alliance was to maintain the strength of the West in the hope that some day the Russians could be persuaded to agree to a more permanent type of peace for Europe. It was in our hands to see the Russian threat to Europe brought back right to the borders of the U.S.S.R. It is now quite possible that we have thrown this away.

9. The Russians are nevertheless still faced with a dreadful dilemma in Hungary. They can, if they wish, destroy the present government and the Hungarian Nationalists. The remnants of the Hungarian Communists are completely discredited, but they have escaped to Moscow. They could be restored in Budapest, but there can be little doubt in the Soviet mind that they would have to be maintained by force. In view of the complete lack of success of the Hungarian Communists in maintaining control of the country and a reasonable economic standard, and in view of the complete opposition throughout the country in every sector of national life to both Communism and the U.S.S.R., it seems doubtful that the Soviet leaders who have shown a willingness to accept the realities in Poland, would be foolish enough to think that such a situation would be permanently possible or profitable.

10. The Soviet leaders must equally, however, have been appalled at the speed with which the Hungarian Nationalists were prepared to withdraw their country from the Soviet orbit and the violence of the anti-Russian sentiments displayed. I do not think that they can tolerate the division of their Satellite empire into a northern and southern tier by the loss of Hungary, or permit the possibility of this country being built up as an anti-Soviet base, something they must undoubtedly fear. They probably suspect, therefore, that the Hungarian government's request for neutrality is simply the first step in bringing Hungary completely over into the Western camp.

11. It is not in the interests of the Western powers to attempt to push things too fast in Eastern Europe, though in all truth we have been completely passive in the events played out in Budapest. The Hungarians have set the pace from the beginning. The Russians themselves have announced their willingness to renegotiate the basis of their relations with the Eastern European countries, and indeed they are now talking of a Commonwealth of Socialist States. Before the Suez crisis really broke on us, they had also announced their willingness to negotiate the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Roumania. If it had been possible for the West to take a diplomatic initiative at this time, this would have been the best possible moment to announce our willingness to negotiate the withdrawal of Western forces from Germany in return for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Germany and all of Eastern Europe. The collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe would have followed almost immediately with the withdrawal of Soviet forces. The effect on the military strength of NATO could hardly have been greater than the effect on the military strength of the U.S.S.R. On the other hand, the West would have gained a tremendous political victory, but as it is the unity and military effectiveness of NATO is sadly shaken without any commensurate political gain.

12. One last thought is that unless the West gives some expression of its solidarity with and sympathy for the Hungarians, we will have lost the last remnants of our prestige in all of Eastern Europe. We can hardly expect that the Roumanians and Czechs will attempt to shake off the dominance of Moscow if the Hungarian battle is lost. I am not suggesting material aid, which is clearly impossible. But some kind of political initiative and support would clearly have been of great moral and political aid to the Hungarians.

11.

DEA/8619-40

*Le représentant permanent auprès des Nations Unies
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Permanent Representative to United Nations
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1099

New York, November 4, 1956

CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.

Repeat London, Washington, Paris, NATO Paris (Information).
By Bag Karachi and Ankara from London, Delhi from Ottawa.⁴

SITUATION IN HUNGARY

In view of the increasing seriousness of the reports from Hungary of Soviet military intervention, the Security Council met again on the Hungarian question at 3 am today and voted on a US resolution calling upon the USSR to desist from any form of intervention and deploring the use of Soviet military forces. This resolution was defeated by the Soviet veto. The representative of Yugoslavia said that he could not take part in the vote since he had no instructions. A second US resolution referring the question to the General Assembly under the "Uniting for Peace" procedure was then adopted by ten (including Yugoslavia) in favour and one against (USSR).⁵

2. The second Emergency Special Session of the Assembly was then convened at 4 pm today. The agenda item on Hungary was adopted by 53 votes in favour, 7 against (Soviet Bloc) and 7 abstentions. There was no Hungarian representative at the meeting since the Hungarian Mission here had notified the Secretary General that they had no credentials valid for this second Emergency Special Session. On the vote to adopt the agenda all members of the Afro-Asian group except Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Liberia and Thailand either abstained or were absent. Yugoslavia abstained.

3. Early in the debate the USA delegation put forward a draft resolution (text follows in separate telegram)⁶ which condemns the use of Soviet military forces to suppress the efforts of the Hungarian people to reassert their rights and requests the Secretary General to investigate the situation caused by foreign intervention in Hungary and to report as soon as possible to the General Assembly. My statement supporting this resolution has already

⁴ Note marginale :/Marginal note:

Repeat by tel for info to New Delhi. Done. L.F. Nov 5/56.

⁵ Pour de plus amples renseignements sur ces deux résolutions, voir United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1955-1957*, Volume XXV, Washington D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1990, pp. 388-389.

For additional information on these two resolutions, see United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1955-1957*, Volume XXV, Washington D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1990, pp. 388-389.

⁶ La version finale de cet avant-projet a été réimprimée au United States, Department of State, *FRUS 1955-1957*, Volume XXV, pp. 392-393.

The final version of this draft is reprinted in United States, Department of State, *FRUS 1955-1957*, Volume XXV, pp. 392-393.

gone forward.⁷ After about ten speakers had been heard it was proposed, although there were still many names on the speakers' list, that a vote be taken immediately and that the remaining speakers be heard later. With the exceptions noted above, no member of the Afro-Asian group was inscribed on the speakers' list.

4. In the vote 8 members of the Soviet Bloc (including Poland) voted against the USA draft resolution (Hungary was not represented). The following 15 countries (Arab-Asian members plus Yugoslavia and Finland) abstained; Libya, India, Ceylon, Indonesia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, Jordan, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen and Yugoslavia and Finland. The remaining delegations (including Pakistan, Iran, Liberia, Turkey, Thailand, Cambodia and Ethiopia) voted in favour. Laos and Lebanon were absent.

5. The Assembly will meet again on this item, probably tomorrow, to hear the remaining speakers and explanations of vote. The latter, from the Afro-Asian group, should be interesting, if indeed any explanations are made. Lall told me at the beginning of the meeting that he could not take any part in the proceedings because he had no instructions. Since this no doubt seemed pretty lame, he added that in any case it was not proper to consider an item entitled "the Hungarian question" in the absence of properly accredited representatives of Hungary.

6. There is no need to underline the significance for the UN and for the relations between Western and Asian countries of this vote.

[L.B.] PEARSON

12.

DEA/8619-40

*Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
pour le secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures*
*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs*

SECRET

[Ottawa], November 7, 1956

SITUATION IN HUNGARY

To clear our minds before attempting any interpretation of the events of the last month in Hungary, it is necessary to set forth as clearly as possible, from a welter of sometimes contradictory reports, a chronology of events.

2. In 1953, after Stalin's death, Imre Nagy became premier and sought to shift emphasis somewhat away from heavy industry and in favour of consumer goods production. Early in 1955, after Khrushchev and Bulganin came to power, Nagy went out and Rakosi re-assumed the dominant position as Party First Secretary. He sought to re-assert the primacy of heavy industry and to re-establish the political controls which had been loosened slightly under Nagy's régime. In July 1955, under mounting pressure from intellectuals and the people at large, and as a result of the logical development of Titoism, he resigned. He was replaced as Party First Secretary by Geroe, a Stalinist associate, and Hegedus, another "tough line" man, became premier.

⁷ Voir Canada, ministère des Affaires extérieures, *Affaires Extérieures*, vol. 8, N° 11, novembre 1956, pp. 347 à 348.
See Canada, Department of External Affairs, *External Affairs*, Vol. 8, No. 11, November 1956, pp. 334-336.

3. Early in October, as if in response to the ferment in Poland, there was further unrest among students and intellectuals. Budapest was the scene of a mass march of 200,000 for the re-burial of Rajk who had just been "re-habilitated" after his execution for Titoism in 1949. Rakosi fled the country, but Geroe remained at the helm and attended the Black Sea talks with Khrushchev and Tito.

4. On October 23, student demonstrations in Budapest erupted into violence involving both the Hungarian security police and Soviet troops. Geroe is credited with asking for or condoning the use of Soviet forces in an attempt to suppress the initial uprising. On October 24, Nagy, known as a national deviationist and regarded as the most popular of the Hungarian Titoists, replaced Geroe. The Communist Party of Hungary was dissolved and re-formed as the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party with Kadar still First Secretary. The government was re-formed as a coalition, including members from other parties of which the most important were the Smallholders Party and the Social Democratic Party.

5. The governmental shuffles were not enough to avert a week of violence and confusion. It is impossible to sort out the aims of the various rebel groups which sprang up, for they ranged from national communist across the political spectrum to democratic socialist, peasant and possibly even farther right. They seemed to have no concrete or integrated plan or policy. Initially they demanded a representative government, the resignation of Rakosi associates, economic reforms, freedom of speech and assembly, democratic elections and withdrawal of all Soviet forces. As the shaky government yielded on these initial demands, violently anti-Russian and anti-communist elements among the rebel groups eclipsed the Titoists. Nagy was pushed further and further in his attempts to accommodate the ever-increasing demands of the rebel groups. He announced the end of collectivization of agriculture. He demanded and temporarily obtained the evacuation of Soviet forces from Budapest. He sought the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Hungary and, after new Soviet units began to move into Hungary, he announced, on November 1 and 2, Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and called on the United Nations to support Hungary's "permanent neutrality".

6. The deployment of Soviet troops is of some significance. Our best information — although it cannot be regarded as entirely firm — is that when the revolt began on October 23, Soviet forces in Hungary consisted of two divisions totalling 32,600 men. As the rebels gained strength, the Russians began a military build-up on October 25. Between October 25-27, one division of 15,000 men was moved in from the USSR and, on the latter date, 10,000 men were transferred to Hungary from Roumania. By this time there were four Soviet divisions of 60,000 men in the country. On October 29, the Soviet forces began to withdraw from Budapest at the insistence of the insurgents and Nagy and in accordance with the promises of Zhukov and Shepilov.

7. On October 30 came the statement from Moscow defining Soviet policy towards Eastern Europe. We do not know whether the terms of this declaration encouraged Nagy and the rebel leaders with whom he was beginning to identify himself to go still further to satisfy the anti-communist and anti-Russian elements in the uprising, or whether Nagy's realization that the USSR had reinforced their military position in Hungary caused him to denounce the Warsaw Pact on November 1 and demand publicly the withdrawal of Soviet forces. His appeal to the United Nations on November 2 to support Hungarian neutrality suggests that fear was stronger than an attempt to placate the anti-communists. By denouncing the Pact he may also have wished to destroy the legal basis for the presence of Soviet troops. Whatever Nagy's motives the immediate Soviet reaction was to send three more divisions into Hungary from the USSR between November 1 and 3 (thus increasing their total strength in Hungary to seven divisions totalling about 200,000 men) and attack Budapest with three divisions on November 4. They clearly were not prepared to permit

Nagy to take Hungary out of the Warsaw Pact and align it with Austria outside the Soviet security system. As the United States representative pointed out to the NATO Council, the Soviet's declaration of October 30 could be interpreted as not applying to a non-communist Government.

8. The first Soviet statements about their readiness to negotiate for the withdrawal of Soviet troops were made before Nagy's declaration of Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. Even after this declaration, as additional troops were being moved into Hungary, the Russians agreed to a meeting between the Soviet and Hungarian military commands on November 3 to discuss withdrawal. The seizure of Nagy, allegedly for condoning the counter-revolution, at the time negotiations were actually in progress, must be seen as an act of duplicity comparable only to the imprisonment of the sixteen Polish leaders who were asked to come to Moscow in 1945 to discuss the future government of Poland.

9. A new puppet government of "workers and peasants" has been set up, headed by Kadar, who has accommodated himself to the new situation. It includes Apro, a supporter of the Nagy programme; Munnich, a former Rakosi associate (Defence and Internal Security); three former socialists and left-wing syndicalists, compromised by long collaboration with Nagy; and Horvath, dropped by Nagy as Foreign Minister and now restored to the post. The stated aims of the puppet régime set up by then Soviet high command, as announced by Radio Moscow on November 4, are given in an annex† to this memorandum. They appear designed to persuade the Hungarians that "democratization" will continue, but the phrases about national independence will seem very hollow to a people subjected to ruthless military repression for going too far and too fast. At the time of writing the rebellion was almost over though pockets of resistance were still holding out.

10. With this chronology of events before us, we must try to analyse the significance of the drastic measures to which the Soviet Union resorted in order to impose its will on a rebellious Hungary.

11. The first important thing to be kept in mind is that the Soviet Union is experiencing grave difficulties in its control in Eastern Europe. These difficulties stem from the Soviet rapprochement with Tito, the doctrine on "differing paths to socialism" adopted by the Twentieth Party Congress, the strong nationalism of the countries of Eastern Europe, the failure of ten years of Soviet control to improve the standard of living of the satellite peoples, and in most of these countries the disastrous failure of the economic programmes. For a wide variety of reasons, the Soviet Union would probably still like to work out a new relationship, based on the declaration of October 30, which would maintain the close relationship between the USSR and its satellites but would leave the satellites with a greater measure of independence at least as to internal policy. But this will depend in large measure on their estimate of the military situation.

12. The Soviet interest in the satellites is political, economic and strategic. It must be recognized that the Soviet Union considers it essential:

(a) that the satellite régimes be at minimum well-disposed to a close or at least friendly relationship with the USSR;

(b) that the Eastern European economies continue to be closely linked with that of the Soviet Union; and

(c) that, either through the presence of Soviet forces or the maintenance of effective satellite military forces willing to align themselves with the Soviet Union in the event of war, the satellites continue to provide defence in depth to the USSR.

It was only when these three essentials seemed to be threatened, i.e. that Hungary might break completely with the Soviet bloc, that the Soviet Union resorted to full-scale force to impose its will.

13. The mistake of the rebels, and of Nagy for trying to keep pace with their demands, was in trying to go too far and too fast. The pattern of the whole operation suggests that, while prepared to use force, the Russians would have preferred to have avoided military action as they did in Poland. The ambivalent approach to Nagy and the Hungarian revolt in the course of the critical week may well be a further reflection of differences of opinion within the Soviet leadership as to how best to handle their problems of imperial control. Mr. Johnson has reported some evidence in Moscow that the army leaders seemed depressed by the Soviet policies in Poland and Hungary, and elated when the attack on the Hungarian rebels was decided on. If strategic arguments were paramount in reaching this decision, then it seems logical to expect an increase in the influence of the military. As of this date, Johnson reports no real sign of a decrease in the influence or importance of Khrushchev. The Soviet Union probably decided reluctantly upon its drastic action, only when the potential defection of Hungary threatened to divide the Soviet Empire into a northern and southern tier. The Soviet leaders must have anticipated the extremely adverse reaction of world public opinion, but this was less important than the possible loss of Hungary and the fear that, if they did not take a firm stand in Hungary, the revolt might spread to other satellites.

14. The chronology of events and the assessment of the probable Soviet reasons for full-scale armed intervention cast some light on the relationship between the Soviet action in Hungary and the Anglo-French action in Egypt. The Anglo-French action and the United Nations discussion of it undoubtedly created a sensational diversion of international public attention and probably helped relieve the anxieties the Russians must have had about reaction abroad. But the fact that troop movements began three or four days before the Israeli attack on Egypt and the fact that three additional divisions were ready to move in immediately Nagy denounced the Warsaw Pact suggests that the Anglo-French action was not the dominant factor in determining the ultimate course of Soviet action, which was determined primarily by military necessity. The scale and timing of their action and the logistic preparations obviously required for mounting such an operation suggest that the decision to deal with Nagy by force if necessary was not directly related to Anglo-French action in Egypt.

15. It is conceivable, however, that the Russians might have been deterred from taking this drastic action if the attention of the world had been fully concentrated on Hungary, and if the Western powers had been firmly united, but the facts tend to disprove this. Nevertheless, had the West not been pre-occupied with the Middle East, we might then have been able to take diplomatic initiative to guarantee Soviet security interests in Eastern Europe, or possibly to take advantage of the declared Soviet willingness to discuss the withdrawal of troops from Hungary, Roumania and Poland.

16. In addition the readiness of the British and French to use force in Egypt might have reinforced the military argument that the USSR could not at that moment afford to risk that Hungary would not only be separated from the Soviet bloc, but might also be used as a spring-board for western incursions against the USSR.

17. But the Soviet dilemma has by no means been solved by their intervention by force to suppress a revolution which they themselves must recognize represented the vast majority of the Hungarian population. In the first place they have to all intents and purposes lost one of the satellite armies. The Kadar government, in spite of its announced programme, will be loathed by most Hungarians and will be able to stay in power only with the support of

Soviet troops. Hungary will certainly for some time to come be a political and economic liability.

18. Armed intervention in Hungary and its brutality have dealt the international prestige of the USSR a severe blow, though its impact on Asian-Arab opinions has been largely lost because of the diversion of opinion in the East and the Middle East crisis. Its effect on Soviet policies in general will be very great, but it is too early to tell in exactly what direction the Russians will now move.

19. In subsequent papers I shall submit some suggestions as to the policies we might consider in the light of the developments in Hungary. I am also preparing papers on Soviet policy in the satellites in the light of the Hungarian revolt,⁸ and the situation in Poland.

J. LIÉGER

13.

PCO

Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet

Extract from Cabinet Conclusions

SECRET

[Ottawa], November 7, 1956

Present

- The Prime Minister (Mr. St-Laurent) in the Chair.
- The Minister of National Health and Welfare
and Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Martin).
- The Minister of Labour (Mr. Gregg). (for afternoon meeting only)
- The Minister of Public Works (Mr. Winters).
- The Minister of Veterans Affairs and Postmaster General (Mr. Lapointe).
- The Minister of Finance (Mr. Harris).
- The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Campney).
- The Leader of the Government in the Senate and Solicitor General (Senator Macdonald).
- The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Mr. Pickersgill).
- The Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources (Mr. Lesage).
- The Minister of Transport (Mr. Marler).
- The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Bryce).
- The Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Martin).
- The Economic Adviser, Privy Council Office (Mr. Lamontagne).

RELIEF FOR HUNGARY

22. *Mr. Martin, as Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs*, considered that a substantial effort would be required to relieve, even in a small degree, the distress of the Hungarian population and to make them feel they had not been deserted by their friends in the west. Whether relief supplies would continue to be allowed into the country was uncertain, but large amounts would be needed in any event to sustain the 15,000 or more refugees who had already escaped. A considerable amount of assistance was already reaching Vienna but much more would be needed.

The Canadian Red Cross had so far devoted some \$28,000 for Hungarian relief and it could draw on the \$600,000 remaining in the old European Flood Relief Fund. However, it was not anxious to exhaust this fund since other emergencies would likely arise for which it would be needed. To supplement existing resources, a campaign was being organized by

⁸ Renvoie peut-être au document 25./Possibly refers to Document 25.

Hungarian groups in Canada to secure voluntary contributions which would be paid to, and administered by, the Red Cross. These activities would not likely meet the situation and a material gesture by the Canadian government appeared desirable, not only to meet the needs of the Hungarians, but also to encourage Canadians to contribute to the campaign being organized. Such action would also be in accord with recent U.N. resolutions urging member governments to assist.

The Minister recommended that Canada offer assistance through the Red Cross either by donating 2,000 tons of butter or, preferably, by contributing \$1 million for relief purposes in Hungary or among Hungarians who had left their country since the uprising began. If the latter proposal were acceptable, a portion of the funds might be turned over at once to the High Commissioner for Refugees. The money involved in both cases might be met from the vote for unforeseen expenditures or by Governor General's warrant, or a combination of both methods.

An explanatory memorandum was circulated.

(Acting Minister's memorandum, Nov. 5, 1956; Cab. Doc. 219-56)*

23. *The Minister of Finance* said he preferred the second form of assistance. However, the vote for unforeseen expenditures was not adequate and he would not like to use a Governor General's warrant. Perhaps, an immediate contribution of \$100,000 as an earnest of the government's intentions would suffice for the moment and the Red Cross could arrange to finance the remainder on a temporary basis. The full amount might be voted at the special session to be called as a result of the contribution to the U.N. police force.

24. *During the discussion* the following points emerged:

(a) Should any of the proposed contribution not be used for purposes described, it should be returned to the Receiver General and not be retained by the Red Cross for other purposes.

(b) Although one could not be sure that Canadian supplies would not reach people in Hungary, it would be undesirable for any contribution to be made at this time for relief purposes in Hungary itself. Austria was faced with a serious problem in dealing with the refugees, especially as there had been a poor crop and a food shortage was possible.

(c) A request had been made to permit exemptions for income tax on contributions to a fund being organized in Montreal. The law would appear to allow exemptions in these circumstances, but the Department of National Revenue had ruled in the past that to claim them, the organization concerned had to conduct the whole operation for which it was established and not just collect funds to pass on to others. It would be preferable if those wishing to help Hungarian refugees were to make their contributions to the Red Cross and exemptions could then be granted in the usual way.

(d) Before reaching a decision on the proposal, the Department of External Affairs should make it clear to the Red Cross that the money should be used for refugees outside of Hungary and ascertain also if part of any grant should be paid direct to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

25. *Mr. Martin* reported later that the Red Cross would use any grant for assistance to refugees not in Hungary, and also that the High Commissioner for Refugees needed funds urgently. He suggested that one grant of \$100,000 to the Red Cross and another of the same size to the High Commissioner be approved in principle now for use in assisting refugees, to be paid when funds were available.

26. *The Cabinet* noted the report of the Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs on relief for Hungary and agreed.

(a) that \$100,000 be contributed to the Canadian Red Cross for the relief of refugees who had left Hungary since the recent uprising in that country began, on the understanding that as much materials and supplies be procured in Canada as possible, and that any portion of the grant not used for the purposes specified be returned to the Receiver General;

(b) that \$100,000 be contributed to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the same relief purposes; and,

(c) that detailed financing arrangements be settled subsequently by the Treasury Board, but that, as an earnest of the government's intentions, \$50,000 be made available immediately from the unforeseen expenses vote of the Department of Finance.

...

14.

DEA/8619-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au représentant permanent auprès du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Permanent Representative to North Atlantic Council*

TELEGRAM SS-245

Ottawa, November 8, 1956

CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.

Repeat Permis New York, Washington, London, Paris, Bonn, Rome, Brussels, Delhi (Most Immediate).

By Bag Moscow, Prague, Belgrade, Oslo, Hague, Athens, Ankara, Cairo, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Pretoria, Wellington, Canberra, Karachi, Colombo, Djakarta, Geneva from London.

By Bag Warsaw, Vienna, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Lisbon, Madrid, Tokyo, Berne from Ottawa.

HUNGARIAN SITUATION

1. The following are the summary conclusions of a longer departmental paper on events in Hungary. It has not yet had ministerial approval and must necessarily still be considered somewhat speculative.

(1) The Soviet Union probably decided to quell the Hungarian rebellion by force (a possible necessity which it had prepared for at the first signs of serious trouble) only when it became clear that Nagy had lost control of the situation and was merely riding the crest of the rebels' ever increasing demands. His concessions and demands meant the end of Communist control and the withdrawal of Hungary from the Soviet Bloc. For political, economic and, most important, strategic reasons, the Soviet Union could not permit this. It would have preferred the maintenance of essential control by less violent means but felt forced to intervene to prevent Hungary's total defection.

(2) The duplicity of the Russians in this action should be noted. During the week when Soviet troops were being moved into Hungary, Bulganin and Zhukov were consistently denying these movements to Western diplomats in Moscow. Moreover, the Russians were actually mounting their full-scale assault on Hungary at the same time as they were offering to negotiate and holding discussions with the Hungarians for the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops.

(3) By its action in Hungary, the Soviet Union has seriously impaired its line of peaceful co-existence and the possibilities for better relations, in all fields, with the West. Unfortu-

nately, the impact on Asia-Arab opinion has been largely dissipated because of diversion of attention to the Middle East.

(4) The timing and pattern of troop movements into Hungary, and the necessary logistical preparation for those movements, show that the Soviet Union was prepared to take drastic action to cope with the Hungarian situation, if it got out of hand, *before* the Israeli attack on Egypt and *before* the Anglo-French action in Egypt. While the latter offered a sensational diversion of international public opinion for action which the Russians decided was necessary for them to take, and thus minimized for the West a great political and propaganda advantage, it cannot be considered as the primary motivating factor for the Russians.

2. As you know, both the Prime Minister and the Minister have condemned the Soviet action in Hungary in forthright terms, and Canada voted for the USA resolution on Hungary at the Special Session of the General Assembly.

3. (For NATO Paris only) You may use this analysis in discussions in the NATO Council.

4. (For other missions) You may use this analysis at your discretion with the Foreign Ministry and with diplomatic colleagues.

15.

DEA/5475-EA-4-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l'Immigration*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Minister of Citizenship and Immigration*

CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, November 9, 1956

My dear Colleague:

I am most grateful to you for the very prompt action which you took to give priority in selection to Hungarian refugees and to extend the assisted passage loan scheme to them. I know this offer by Canada, as well as the grants of \$100,000 each to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and the Canadian Red Cross, is greatly appreciated by all who are concerned with the plight of these unfortunate people. I see in this morning's paper that wide publicity is being given in Austria to our offer.¹

¹ Le 6 novembre 1956, J. W. Pickersgill a publié le communiqué suivant :

"With the approval of the Prime Minister and in accordance with the general policy of the Government respecting refugees, the Canadian Immigration Office in Vienna has been instructed to give priority to applications from refugees from Hungary. Assisted Passage Loans will be available to such immigrants on the same terms as to other immigrants from Europe." Des instructions semblables ont été communiquées aux agents d'immigration en poste à Londres, à Paris, à La Haye, à Cologne, à Copenhague, à Rome, à Bruxelles, à Stockholm, à Oslo et à Berne. En outre, Pickersgill a annoncé que les réfugiés hongrois n'avaient pas besoin de parrains canadiens ou de répondre aux exigences professionnelles habituelles. Voir Canada, ministère des Affaires extérieures, *Affaires Extérieures*, vol. 8, N° 11, p. 337.

On November 6, 1956, J.W. Pickersgill issued the following statement:

"With the approval of the Prime Minister and in accordance with the general policy of the Government respecting refugees, the Canadian Immigration Office in Vienna has been instructed to give priority to applications from refugees from Hungary. Assisted Passage Loans will be available to such immigrants on the same terms as to other immigrants from Europe." Similar instructions were issued to immigration officers in London, Paris, The Hague, Cologne, Copenhagen, Rome, Brussels, Stockholm, Oslo and Berne. In addition, Pickersgill announced that Hungarian refugees did not need to have Canadian sponsors or meet the normal occupational requirements. See Canada, Department of External Affairs, *External Affairs*, Vol. 8, No. 11, p. 325.

I should like to raise with you the possibility that, in the case of Hungarian refugees, we might adopt a more liberal policy than would be applicable to a regular immigration operation. I am afraid that, if we stick rigidly to the usual health and job training requirements, Canada's offer to give priority will seem a rather meagre one compared with what I understand are unconditional quota offers by a number of other countries. If the word gets around, as it is bound to, that we are willing to take only the hale and the hearty and that we are leaving those whose need for help is greater to other countries, then it is bound to reflect adversely on Canadian willingness to help.

You are no doubt aware that a number of outstanding applications from Hungarians have already been approved by your Department. They concern persons with close relatives in Canada who had been denied exit permits by the Hungarian authorities. It is conceivable that some of these applicants may have fled Hungary along with other refugees. If any in this category should present themselves to Canadian immigration officials along with other refugees I think it would be desirable that they be given special consideration in view of the fact that their applications have already been approved.

I need not emphasize the domestic and international political desirability of making it clear that Canada is taking an unselfish interest in the plight of the Hungarian refugees. I hope, therefore, that it may be possible to waive for the present purposes some of the conditions which, while admirably suited to normal immigration, do not fully meet the requirements of the present urgent situation.

Yours sincerely,

L.B. PEARSON

16.

DEA/8619-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au haut-commissaire en Inde*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs
to High Commissioner in India*

TELEGRAM SS-251

Ottawa, November 9, 1956

SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

HUNGARY

I am grateful for your prompt and effective efforts to bring to Mr. Nehru's attention the apparent discrepancy between his attitude to the situation in the Middle East and that in Hungary. His UNESCO statement was perhaps all that we could have hoped for and Menon's statement at the UN on the same issue has been welcome.

2. In view of Menon's cooperative and not unreasonable attitude so far in New York, we should not, I think, press further at the risk of turning the Indians sour. You must protect your excellent position in Delhi and not endanger it too much on the Hungarian question. It would be preferable, I think, if your note to Nehru remained unofficial and personal, since it has in any case achieved its purpose.

L.B. PEARSON

17.

DEA/8619-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au haut-commissaire en Inde*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs
to High Commissioner in India*

TELEGRAM SS-252

Ottawa, November 9, 1956

SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

Reference: Your telegram 684 of November 6th and my telegram SS-245 of November 8.

SITUATION IN HUNGARY

If you wish to show my SS-245 to any members of the Indian government you may wish to expand verbally on the conclusions of its paragraph 4.

2. The Soviet military build-up from two divisions began at least as early as October 25 and reached a total in Hungary of four divisions by October 27 and of possibly nine divisions by November 3. The Russians attacked Budapest on November 4 with three divisions and set up a puppet communist government under Kadar which promises only a limited number of the rebel demands.

3. The timing and pattern of Soviet troop movements into Hungary, which required extensive logistical planning, show that the USSR was ready to take drastic action before the Israeli and Anglo-French action in Egypt. The latter action has diverted foreign and Soviet public opinion from a resort to brutality, the only course of which the Soviet leadership is capable when its vital interests are threatened by a genuinely nationalist movement, and cannot be considered as the primary motivating factor for the Russians.

18.

DEA/8619-40

*Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
pour le premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
for Prime Minister*

CONFIDENTIAL.

[Ottawa], November 12, 1956

SOVIET INTERVENTION IN HUNGARY

Soviet armed intervention in Hungary cannot help but have a profound effect throughout the world and upon relations between Canada and the Soviet Union. Here, and in New York, we have been engaged in efforts to determine what we can best do to stop the bloodshed in Hungary and to take advantage of the difficulties which the Soviet Union is facing in its European empire.

2. For the moment, I think the best thing we can do, apart from extending material assistance to the Hungarian people and the Hungarian refugees, is to give whole hearted moral support to the condemnatory resolutions which the General Assembly has passed. We voted on November 4 for the first resolution, and on November 10 for the supplementary

Italian, U.S. and Austrian resolutions.¹⁰ To my mind, the most important thing is to bring it in upon the Russians that, by their own actions, they have shattered whatever confidence in their intentions the world had begun to entertain, and that they stand alone and isolated before world public opinion. At the same time I think we must not go so far that we nullify whatever chances may remain of moderating to some extent the severity of Soviet repression by a genuine humanitarian appeal.

3. With this in mind, I have drafted for your consideration the attached message to Premier Bulganin. If you agree, I propose transmitting it through our Ambassador in Moscow. It might later be published.

4. I would also like to suggest that you call in the Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Chuvahin, to impress upon him the extremely unfavourable reaction which Soviet actions in Hungary have caused in this country. You might tell him that, if the Soviet Union persists in this course of action, it is idle to speak of improving relations in any field between Canada and the Soviet Union. You might also read out to him the message which you have sent to Premier Bulganin to impress upon him the seriousness with which the Canadian Government and people view the events of the last few days.

5. The attached message was shown to Mr. Pearson before he left again for New York. He was in two minds about sending it and suggested that another way of coping with the matter would be for you to call the Soviet Ambassador in and give him orally the substance of the message. Mr. Pearson said he would like to leave it to you to decide which you thought was the better course of action.

J. LÉGER

19.

DEA/2462-40

Le premier ministre
au président du Conseil des ministres de l'Union soviétique
Prime Minister
to Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Soviet Union

Ottawa, November 13, 1956

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I consider it my urgent duty to let you know that the people and the Government of Canada have been profoundly shocked by the reports we have received of the actions your Government has taken in Hungary during the last few weeks. We have made our attitude clear in the position taken by Canada in voting for the United Nations resolutions on this subject. I wish to add my plea not only for rapid compliance on the part of the Soviet Government with these resolutions, but for a display even at this late date of moderation towards the unfortunate victims of these tragic events.

¹⁰ Pour de plus amples renseignements sur ces trois résolutions, voir United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1955-1957, Volume XXV*, Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1990, pp. 428-429.

For additional information on these three resolutions, see United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1955-1957, Volume XXV*, Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1990, pp. 428-429.

I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that I speak for the whole people of Canada in expressing our horror at the suffering of the Hungarian people as a result of their efforts to obtain the freedom to choose their own type of Government. It is not, however, my present purpose to attempt to pass judgment on the actions that have been taken but to ask you, in the name of humanity, to use your influence to alleviate the sufferings of the Hungarian people and to permit competent international agencies and organizations to help in the urgent work of distributing food and caring for the sick. In this humanitarian work the Canadian Government and people are already giving material support wherever it is within their power to do so.

The Government and people of Canada have no desire to influence the form of Government chosen by the peoples of Eastern Europe. Our only aim is that they should be free to do so, and that the Governments so chosen should steer their own independent courses, respecting the equal rights of all their neighbours and bearing in mind only the needs and wishes of their own people in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter.

Yours sincerely,

LOUIS S. ST-LAURENT

20.

DEA/8619-40

*Le haut-commissaire en Inde
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in India
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 764

New Delhi, November 13, 1956

TOP SECRET (CANADIAN EYES ONLY). IMMEDIATE.

Reference: Your KK-150 November 12.†

NEHRU AND HUNGARY

This morning November 13 I had a 25 minute conversation with Nehru in his office just before the opening of the Colombo Prime Minister's meeting at 9:30.

2. I began by thanking him for granting me an interview at a time when I knew he was even more pressed than usual. I had reported to you that it was expected he would be making a considered statement on Indian foreign policy in Parliament November 14. You knew that he was receiving information about events in Hungary from India's own missions abroad and from friendly governments. Canada had some information which you wished me to give him. Normally I would have given the information to Pillai for transmission to him but I was under instructions that the information contained in one of the documents was not repeat not to be committed to writing but was to be given orally (meaning your SS-252 November 9).

3. I then handed him a memorandum embodying your SS-245 November 8. Before I had a chance to go on with the oral expansion of paragraph 4 of the memorandum Nehru said that the essential charge in the Departmental paper was of "duplicity" against the Russians, that their statement of October 30 was "eyewash". However both Russia and China keep striking forces always ready. It is therefore possible that the decision to move into Hungary had been taken after October 30.

4. I said that another telegram which I had received from you demonstrated that the Soviet build-up had begun as early as October 25 and had reached a total in Hungary of four divisions by October 27 and of possibly nine divisions by November 3. Thus by October 30 when the Soviet statement was issued the number of Soviet troops in Hungary was already somewhere between four divisions and nine divisions. I then read to him slowly the operative paragraphs of SS-252.

5. Nehru said we had to go back beyond the actual Anglo-French invasion of Egypt. UK and France had been moving troops in the Mediterranean from August on. The implications of this would make it necessary for the USSR to begin to make its own troop dispositions.

6. I said that I had nothing to go on except the information [in] your 252, but I failed to follow Nehru in his reference to a connection between the Anglo-French military build-up in the Mediterranean and the Soviet mobilization against Hungary beginning on October 25.

7. Nehru said that what we were both doing was trying to make logical deductions from the information in the telegram I had read to him. It was clear and here he mentioned the Yugoslav interpretation of events in Russia that for some months there had been 2 groups within the Russian government pulling in different directions. One group was prepared to allow the trends towards liberalization in Poland and other Eastern European countries to continue; the other considered it dangerous to let these get out of hand. We must remember the mentality of the Russians in respect of Eastern Europe. They consider that the USA by various means is "constantly inciting the people of Eastern Europe to revolt".

8. The mere fact that the Soviet military buildup against Hungary had begun at least as early as October 25 did not repeat not necessarily mean that the tougher group in the Soviet government had won out by that time. When on a critical issue opinion within a government is divided it is often necessary for a government to authorize preparations for the action which would have to be taken in the event the Government finally comes down in favour of one side or the other. Thus the fact that by October 25 the Soviet government had authorized a military buildup against Hungary did not repeat not necessarily mean the Soviet government had then decided on a tough policy against Hungary. It could mean merely that the Soviet government had authorized the buildup in case the government finally accepted the views of the tougher faction.

9. I agreed that undoubtedly what he had said of the way any government would act was correct. I drew his attention however to an article in the *Hindustan Times* this morning on the genesis of the Hungarian revolution which referred to the initial spark being the huge student demonstrations on October 23. I said it was surely significant that the other faction in the Soviet government was strong enough only 2 days after the first student demonstration to get authority for what amounted to partial mobilization against Hungary.

10. Nehru said that just as there had been indications for some days ahead of the launching of the attack that Israel was going to attack Egypt — indications so strong that Eisenhower had made representations to the Israel government — so also there could have been indications to Russia even before the student demonstration of October 23 in Budapest that the Soviet position in Hungary was going to be threatened. I said that so far as I could recall the only public advance notice had been a statement about 2 days before October 23 that the students of Budapest were going to put on a peaceful demonstration.

11. Nehru said that what he was thinking of was the process of liberalization which had started in Poland a good deal earlier and which the Russians must have known would affect Hungary.

12. (Group corrupt) to Nehru's remarks about conflicts between 2 groups in Moscow. I said that I had a copy of a telegram of November 5 from our Ambassador in Moscow which gave his interpretation of what had been happening there. I then handed Nehru a memorandum embodying Moscow's telegram 367 November 5.¹¹ Since it was now about 9:20 I went on immediately to say that the only other document I had to give him was one containing extracts from a statement you had made at a press conference on November 9 on the rejection by the USSR of the UN resolution to send supplies to Hungary.¹¹ I gave him a memorandum embodying the information in your telegram YY-606 November 10.¹²

13. Without giving him a chance to comment I went on to say that there (was?) one pleasant matter I would like to bring up. I spoke about the International Police Force along the lines of my telegram 763 November 13¹² and we then had a few minutes talk about Nehru's hope that he would be able to visit Canada.¹² On this I am also reporting separately.

14. At the end of our talk Nehru said that while the agenda for Parliament for November 14 did state that he was going to give a speech on international affairs it would not repeat not be possible for him to do so because of being tied up with the meetings of the Colombo Prime Ministers. Consequently the speech had had to be postponed to November 16. I said I was looking forward to hearing him that day.

15. My conversation with Nehru was most depressing example of his willingness to find the least blameworthy explanation of every step the USSR has taken in respect of Hungary.

[E.] REID

21.

PCO

Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet

Extract from Cabinet Conclusions

SECRET

[Ottawa], November 14, 1956

Present

- The Prime Minister (Mr. St-Laurent) in the Chair.
- The Minister of Trade and Commerce and Minister of Defence Production (Mr. Howe).
- The Minister of Labour (Mr. Gregg).
- The Minister of Veterans Affairs and Postmaster General (Mr. Lapointe).
- The Minister of Fisheries (Mr. Sinclair).
- The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Campney).
- The Leader of the Government in the Senate and Solicitor General and Acting Minister of Justice (Senator Macdonald).
- The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Mr. Pickersgill).
- The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Bryce).
- The Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Martin).
- The Registrar of the Cabinet (Mr. Halliday).

¹¹ Voir/See *The Globe and Mail*, November 10, 1956, p. 2.

¹² Voir Canada, Ministère des Affaires étrangères et du commerce international, *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada, 1956-1957*, Volume 22, Tome II, Ottawa, Ministère des Travaux publics et Services gouvernementaux, le document 692.

See Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Documents on Canadian External Relations, 1956-1957*, Volume 22, Part II, Ottawa, Department of Public Works and Government Services, Document 692.

IMMIGRATION: HUNGARIAN REFUGEES

21. *The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration* reported that he had had an opportunity, when recently in Toronto, of explaining at a private meeting of the heads of organizations representing new Canadians from European countries behind the "Iron Curtain", what the plans of the Canadian government were to help Hungarian refugees wishing to emigrate to Canada. This had been a timely opportunity as there had been considerable misrepresentation in Toronto as to these plans and views had been advanced that the proposed priorities for such refugees were mere talk and would be nullified by immigration red tape.

He had explained that orders had been given to immigration offices that all Hungarian cases were to be given first priority, that no application by a Hungarian was to be turned down on account of any technicality, and that the ordinary rules of sponsorship would not apply so that a request from anybody reasonably able to look after a refugee would be considered and dealt with promptly.

22. *Mr. Pickersgill* added that, so far, there had been very few cases coming forward. The reason was, no doubt, that the refugees in Austria were mainly women, children and old men who were in too dazed a condition to think about emigration and were only concerned with keeping alive. This situation might well alter in the future, however. He felt the immigration officials in Toronto were doing a good job and were making Hungarian Canadians and others concerned realize that the Federal government was interested and sympathetic at this time of difficulty. The United States proposals to admit an additional 5,000 Hungarians had received considerable publicity but it was not realized that it was merely a proposal to place a bill to this effect before Congress. At the moment it meant nothing. Also, in his opinion, it would be inadvisable to contemplate establishment of any refugee camp in Canada. Only those refugees should be taken who could take employment or who could be looked after by others. The equivalent expenditure would provide direct relief for far more persons in Europe than in Canada.

23. *The Cabinet* noted, with approval the report of the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration on the explanation he had given in Toronto about the immigration proposals to assist Hungarian refugees.

22.

DEA/5475 EA-4-40

*Note du chef de la Direction européenne
pour le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Head, European Division,
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

[Ottawa], November 14, 1956

CANADIAN AID FOR HUNGARIAN REFUGEES

In my memorandum of November 9, 1956,† I pointed out that our contribution to this problem was not as generous as it first appeared and that we ought to try to liberalize our regulations with regard to the admittance of Hungarian refugees unless we were to be exposed to considerable criticism. This has already commenced as can be seen from the

attached editorials in the *Toronto Telegram*¹³ and the *Globe and Mail*,¹⁴ among others, which refer to the attitude of the Immigration Department as double-talk with little practical significance. The *Montreal Gazette* of this morning also suggests that Mr. Pickersgill will face criticism in Parliament for the policy he announced respecting the entry to Canada of Hungarian refugees.¹⁵ Annexed are a few excerpts from the press, and some typical editorials.

2. I attach a telegram of November 13⁺ from the Canadian Delegation in New York which indicates that other countries have agreed to admit Hungarian refugees as follows:

Argentine	-	3,000 children
Australia	-	3,000
Belgium	-	4,000
France	-	as many as wish to go
Netherlands	-	1,000
New Zealand	-	500
Sweden	-	1,000
Switzerland	-	2,000
United Kingdom	-	2,500
United States	-	5,000
Germany	-	3,000
Italy	-	2,000
Israel	-	all Jewish refugees

In addition, it would appear that the United States administration is making a special effort to cut through the red tape in order to admit the refugees immediately.

3. Dr. Stanbury, of the Red Cross, phoned me this morning to give me a report on the interview which the Head of the Hungarian-Canadian Federation had had on Monday with Mr. Pickersgill in which an attempt had been made by the Hungarians to secure details of what our immigration policy really is. The delegation, according to Dr. Stanbury, is extremely dissatisfied as they were not able to get any clarification on what the immigration policy means in regard to the following points:

(a) sponsorship — financial aid is apparently still required; and

(b) health — Mr. Pickersgill said that they were prepared to accept some substandard health risks but that it was up to the sponsors to secure the approval of the provinces. If this were not forthcoming all the refugees would be required to meet medical standards and other normal immigration requirements.

4. Dr. Stanbury told me that the Red Cross has had in the past, in a few humanitarian cases, been required to deposit bonds with the provinces accepting immigrants with a risk of T.B. He added that the tragedy of it seemed to be that there were many empty T.B. beds all across Canada but he saw little hope of cutting through red tape. He did add, however, that he was worried about the reaction of the Hungarian-Canadians when it became entirely clear to them that in fact Canada was not proposing to give any assistance to the refugees in the way of admitting them to this country except in cases which would be obviously profitable to Canada.

¹³ Voir/See *Toronto Telegram*, November 12, 1956, "Let Hungarian Refugees In," p. 8.

¹⁴ Voir/See *The Globe and Mail*, November 12, 1956, "The Gains," p. 6.

¹⁵ Voir/See Arthur Blakely, *Montreal Gazette*, November 14, 1956, "Ottawa Day by Day," p. 8.

5. As this question has internal political, as well as international, implications, you may wish to let the Minister know. So far as I am aware Mr. Pickersgill has not yet replied to Mr. Pearson's letter on the subject.¹⁶

R.A.D. FIORDI

23.

PCO

*Note du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
pour le Cabinet*

*Memorandum from Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Cabinet*

CABINET DOCUMENT NO. 222-56

Ottawa, November 15, 1956

CONFIDENTIAL

RELIEF FOR HUNGARY

It will be recalled that on November 7 the decision was taken to make available the amount of \$200,000 for the relief of Hungarian refugees. One half of this amount is to be assigned to the United Nations Refugees Fund, the other half to the Canadian Red Cross Society for emergency relief of refugees from Hungary.

The decision concerning those relief arrangements for refugees from Hungary (who are mainly in Austria, where their number has been estimated at some 15,000 (now reported as increased to 21,000)) was taken at a time when it appeared that the Red Cross might be prevented from bringing effective assistance to the tens of thousands of people suffering acute distress in Hungary. Although reports are far from complete, it is clear that shortages of food, medical supplies and shelter are critical in Budapest and other parts of Hungary. Red Cross authorities in Vienna have informed the Canadian Red Cross Society that shipments of butter, wheat, flour and dried milk would be particularly welcome.

On November 9 the General Assembly resolved by 67 votes in favour (including Canada), none against and 8 abstentions "to undertake on a large scale immediate aid for the affected territories by furnishing medical supplies, foodstuffs and clothes", and called upon all Member States "to participate to the greatest extent possible in this relief action".

Despite opposition from Soviet sources the Red Cross has now been able to begin effective relief operations within Hungary, and it is believed by Red Cross authorities that they will be able to maintain and expand the relief services which have begun with the arrival of the first two convoys. In view of the large number of people in acute distress, and the extent of the physical damage to the city of Budapest, it seems clear that the relief required will be on a massive scale.

As the original contribution approved last week was to be limited to the relief of refugees, and as effective relief activities on what will undoubtedly prove a substantially larger scale are now being undertaken by the Red Cross within Hungary, the Government will no doubt wish to consider whether a contribution should be made to the support of this latter relief programme.

¹⁶ Note marginale /Marginal note:

Please have telegram prepared to minister. It could take the form of a draft telegram he could send from N.Y. to Mr. Pickersgill. J. Ljéger]

The political arguments in favour of such a contribution are obviously powerful. The entire world has been stirred with admiration for the heroism and determination of the Hungarian people in their bitter opposition to their Soviet oppressors. Their struggle has been a lonely one, since the risks of causing a greater catastrophe in the form of a general war have, amongst other reasons, prevented the western countries from providing any military assistance. We must nevertheless welcome the persistence of Hungarian opposition, even though it may be passive rather than military from now on, for it will make more difficult that Soviet control of Eastern Europe which it is our objective to diminish. The Hungarian revolt has been the first major proof that Soviet indoctrination and methods of control have not been successful, despite ten years of Soviet effort, and we must assume that opposition will continue in one form or other. As the Hungarian opposition is striving for the goals we consider desirable, we should give it whatever help we can. This opposition will be less effective if the people of Hungary come to consider themselves deserted or neglected in their hour of need. It is to be hoped that they will understand why western countries could not intervene militarily, but they would find it very difficult to understand a failure to assist them in the ways that are open. Emergency relief assistance is their most immediate need, and one which Canada and other western countries can meet.

Information on action being taken or contemplated by other governments is far from complete, but the latest reports will be made available for the discussion of this memorandum by the Cabinet. It is perhaps appropriate to mention here, however, that the Government of the United States has already offered to provide relief assistance to a total of twenty million dollars, and President Eisenhower stated on November 14: "We should — try — to get into Hungary as much as we can to help out these unfortunate people". The Soviet Government has announced that it will provide relief supplies of various types to Hungary, in at least some cases free of charge. This no doubt will have some effect in relieving distress, even though distribution of these supplies is unlikely to be impartial and present indications are that the scale of Soviet relief, though substantial, will not be adequate to meet the requirements. Poland, having itself recently asserted a measure of independence from Soviet control, has announced that voluntary contributions from the Polish people for Hungarian relief have been provided to the extent of \$2 million. This is of course desirable. Nevertheless it is important on humanitarian as well as political grounds that the western countries should extend substantial aid to be distributed impartially to those in distress in Hungary.

In view of the urgent need, the political considerations mentioned, the desirability of balancing aid to those Hungarians who have stayed in their country with that already provided for those who have fled, and the probable efforts of other governments including the United States, it is suggested that the Government might make an additional contribution of eight hundred thousand dollars to provide for emergency relief in Hungary. This might best be done by making this sum available to the Canadian Red Cross Society, to be drawn on as needed to finance the provision of supplies for utilization in Hungary by the International Red Cross. In informing the Canadian Red Cross Society of this contribution it would be appropriate to suggest that to the extent practical and economical the money be used to provide supplies of Canadian origin.

In this latter connection there are several possibilities that come to mind. It appears that a most acute need is for foodstuffs; hence some of the money, up to perhaps some \$300,000 could be used to provide butter from Government stocks. There is also the fact that the proposed trade agreement with Hungary would have provided for the supply of Canadian wheat to Hungary. The conclusion of that agreement has been suspended, but there is some indication that Hungarian authorities may, in any case, approach us concern-

ing a possible wheat sale. The provision of Canadian wheat as emergency relief might usefully precede the sale of wheat if that should subsequently prove possible and desirable. Indeed a particularly favourable impression would probably be created, both in Hungary and elsewhere, if milled flour could be made available promptly to alleviate the acute food shortage. This might be done by arranging for the release of flour from commercial stocks in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, to be replaced in due course from Canadian sources.

Another possibility, which would have to be carefully studied in terms of the supply situation in Europe, would be the provision of powdered milk. There is no Government stock of this commodity, but it is believed that there are supplies available in commercial hands which might perhaps be suitably packaged for emergency distribution. Consideration might also be given to the provision of powdered eggs, which it is understood may become surplus in Canada within the next few weeks.

I therefore recommend that the Government make an additional offer of eight hundred thousand dollars, to be made available as required to the Canadian Red Cross Society, for relief in Hungary, subject to the condition that the Red Cross must be able effectively to supervise the distribution of relief and ensure that it is provided impartially to those in need. I recommend further that the use to be made of the money should be discussed with the Canadian Red Cross Society, in order to encourage the provision, to the extent practical and economical, of appropriate supplies of Canadian origin. Finally, I recommend that an immediate announcement be made of this offer and of the Government's intention to request the necessary funds from the forthcoming Special Session of Parliament.

(L.B. PEARSON)

24.

DEA/5475-EA-4-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au chef de la délégation à l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies*
*Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Chairman, Delegation to United Nations General Assembly*

TELEGRAM SS-275

Ottawa, November 19, 1956

CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.

HUNGARIAN REFUGEES

Following for the Minister: I am sending you in my immediately following telegram text of aide-mémoire left on Friday by Austrian Chargé d'Affaires, in which Austrian government, in pressing appeal, asks us to share heavy burden of taking care of high number Hungarian refugees still entering Austria.

Mr. Pickersgill (who returns Ottawa from Vancouver tonight and leaves for Europe probably next Saturday) has not yet replied to your letter on subject of November 9. You then recommended to him that we might adopt, in the case of the Hungarian refugees, a more liberal policy than would be applicable to a regular immigration operation, in view of the internal political, as well as international, implications. It has since appeared that our contribution on this question was not as generous as we first thought. Criticism is already being voiced in the press and among Canadians of Hungarian origin that our regulations regarding admittance of Hungarian refugees are not sufficiently liberal. For these reasons, it is suggested that you might raise again this matter with Mr. Pickersgill on an urgent

basis. Following is text of telegram you might wish to send him directly from New York, if you agree.

"My department is sending you text of aide-mémoire in which Austrian government, in pressing appeal, asks that we continue with other friendly governments to share in taking care of high number of Hungarian refugees still entering Austria.

Austrian request adds further weight and urgency to proposal I made in my letter to you on this subject of November 9, that we might adopt in the case of the Hungarian refugees a more liberal policy than would be applicable to a regular immigration operation. Considering the unconditional offers made by numerous other countries, it appears that our contribution on this question has not been as generous as might be hoped. I also understand that criticism on this score is already being voiced in the Canadian press and among Canadians of Hungarian origin.

Again I need not emphasize the domestic and international political desirability of making it clear that Canada is taking an unselfish interest in the plight of the Hungarian refugees. I hope that you will be able to give this important matter your urgent consideration and that it will be possible to waive most of the non-political immigration requirements in this urgent and exceptional situation."¹⁷

[J.] LÉGER

25.

DEA/50128-B-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au représentant permanent auprès du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord*
*Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Permanent Representative to North Atlantic Council*

TELEGRAM SS-282

Ottawa, November 21, 1956

SECRET. IMPORTANT.

Reference: My telegram SS-260 November 13.†

Repeat London, Washington, Paris, Bonn (Information).

By Bag Moscow, Stockholm, Belgrade, Prague, Warsaw, Vienna.

THE SITUATION IN EASTERN EUROPE

The NATO countries were caught completely napping by the events in Hungary, and, of course, the Middle East diversions prevented us from concentrating our diplomatic resources on this problem. It would be disastrous if this were to be repeated and I am therefore advancing a few ideas which might be put forward when this question is next discussed in the NATO Council.

2. The dilemma for the Russians, of course, is that they have seriously endangered their policy of co-existence and the position of the Communist parties in Western Europe, in order to keep Hungary in the Soviet bloc, and to protect their strategic position. They might now very well wish to establish a national communist régime in Hungary which would, however, remain an integral part of the Soviet bloc, but it seems doubtful that they will be able to govern except by a military régime.

¹⁷ On ne sait pas très bien si ce message a déjà été envoyé à Pickersgill.

It is not clear whether this message was ever sent to Pickersgill.

3. This is bound to have its effects on the other satellites, and in Poland and Yugoslavia. The brutal repression of Hungary is likely to discourage other revolts. In Poland it may have the effect of slowing down the too rapid evolution towards national communism, but will also add fuel to the anti-Russian, anti-communist fires.

4. It is difficult, therefore, to see how the Russians can simultaneously suppress Hungary and the satellites, and yet continue the Khrushchev policy towards Yugoslavia, and tolerate the evolution of Poland.

5. It is this dilemma which might precipitate another crisis, with all the implications for the West since either Soviet policy carries with it the seeds of further unrest. If there should be an outburst in Poland, it would certainly arouse the strongest of feelings in the West, possibly with considerable pressure "to do something". If it should happen in Czechoslovakia, with an open frontier on the West, then the pressure to help the Czechs might be overwhelming. Admittedly there seems little likelihood of an outbreak in the latter country, but it cannot be dismissed entirely.

6. We must be prepared then for two eventualities, either that violence should spread; or that the evolution towards national communism in Poland, Hungary, and possibly the other satellites continues. This requires an early clarification of the kind of positive, and above all joint, action the Western Powers can take to meet either possibility, since the only thing we can be sure about is that the situation will not remain static.

7. In the event of another outbreak of violence, as suggested in paragraph 5, we would presumably want to rule out military action, since this would mean world war, but there may be ways to bring non-military action to bear in addition to the UN.

8. In the event that violence does not spread, the best hope probably lies in encouraging "gradualism" in the evolution of Eastern Europe. As a start, now that jamming of foreign broadcasts has ceased in Poland, we might counsel the Polish people to exercise patience in order to avoid another Hungarian catastrophe. We are already taking steps here to make sure that the tone of our CBC-IS Polish broadcasts is not inflammatory.

9. This, of course, has another aim of not confirming Soviet fears and suspicions of ultimate Western aims in Eastern Europe. This is intimately connected with a new Western policy (and propaganda) which would try to re-assure the Russians on their security problem. In this connection, there are many variations on the theme of guaranteeing legitimate Soviet security interests in Eastern Europe, which could be discussed.

10. Ultimately our aim should be to help the Russians to see that the examples of Yugoslavia, Poland and Hungary prove that they can only combine the two aims of protecting their security and maintaining communist régimes by the use of brute force; and that the most they can hope for in the long run is neutrality for Eastern Europe along the lines of Yugoslavia. This, of course, should not be our proclaimed policy, but discreet encouragement of the Gornulka régime and the national communists would be a first step in the right direction. This must be done very carefully, however, and not at the risk of frightening the Russians into thinking we were trying to detach Poland from the Soviet bloc.

11. If it becomes clear that the Russians were prepared to permit evolution towards national communism to develop, then some of the specific steps we could eventually take to encourage this might be: to strengthen economic ties, emphasizing the switch to consumer goods and those aspects of the satellite economies which would add least to war potential; a gradual move towards multi-lateralism (a United Kingdom suggestion), emphasizing first of all links between Poland and Yugoslavia, etc, closer diplomatic contacts, more cultural contacts, and so on. It should be underlined that this is a long term suggestion and is very much dependent on the course of Soviet policy.

12. These are very preliminary ideas, of course, and your own suggestions and comments would be most useful. The main thing, in our mind, is to regain the initiative in an area of immense importance to the West, and at least start serious consideration of a new Western policy. The Minister agrees with the general line of thinking advanced in this telegram.

13. For London, Washington, Paris, Bonn: I should appreciate your views. If the occasion arises you might use some of these ideas with local officials in order to ascertain the thinking of the government to which you are accredited.

[J.] LÉGER

26.

PCO

Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet

Extract from Cabinet Conclusions

SECRET

[Ottawa], November 22, 1956

Present

- The Prime Minister (Mr. St-Laurent) in the Chair.
- The Minister of Trade and Commerce and Minister of Defence Production (Mr. Howe).
- The Minister of National Revenue (Dr. McCann).
- The Minister of Labour (Mr. Gregg).
- The Minister of Justice (Mr. Garson).
- The Minister of Public Works and Acting Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Winters).
- The Minister of Veterans Affairs and Postmaster General (Mr. Lapointe).
- The Minister of Finance (Mr. Harris).
- The Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys (Mr. Prudham).
- The Minister of Fisheries (Mr. Sinclair).
- The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Campney).
- The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Mr. Pickersgill).
- The Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources (Mr. Lesage).
- The Minister of Transport (Mr. Marler).
- The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Bryce).
- The Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Martin).
- The Economic Adviser, Privy Council Office (Mr. Lamontagne).

RELIEF FOR HUNGARY
(PREVIOUS REFERENCE NOV. 7)

9. *The Prime Minister, on behalf of the Secretary of State for External Affairs*, submitted a further report on relief for Hungary. The number of refugees had increased considerably. Also, it was now believed that effective relief operations could be carried on inside the country itself. In view of the powerful political arguments for increasing the scale of assistance and the urgent need, the Minister recommended that a further contribution of \$800,000 be made to the Canadian Red Cross for emergency relief inside Hungary. To the extent that it was practical and economical, the money might be used for supplies of Canadian origin such as wheat, powdered milk, or powdered eggs, all of which would be useful.

An explanatory memorandum had been circulated.

(Memorandum, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Nov. 15, 1956 — Cab. Doc. 222-56)

10. *During the discussion* the following points emerged:

(a) The contribution of \$200,000 authorized so far was too small. Already pressure was developing to increase it. However, in making this increase for purposes inside Hungary, as well as outside, it was essential that the relief be handled by the Red Cross and not controlled by the present Hungarian government.

(b) In principle, it was a mistake to provide this relief. Either the revolt in Hungary would be so ruthlessly suppressed that it would be a long time before the people ever rose again, or else there would be continuous unrest and trouble. By contributing supplies was not Canada dampening down the Hungarian desire for freedom?

(c) Some pressure was likely to develop to establish refugee camps in Canada. Any such action would give rise to appalling problems. More value could be obtained, and the immediate needs of sufferers best met, by providing relief in Europe rather than by using the same money to bring refugees here. For this reason, a reasonably adequate contribution, announced quite soon, was desirable.

(d) Apart from the \$200,000 already committed to the Red Cross and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the increased funds should not be specifically earmarked. The vote should be broad enough, for instance, to cover any assessment the U.N. might make on its members for Hungarian refugee problems.

11. *The Cabinet* approved the recommendation of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and agreed that a further \$800,000 be made available for the relief of Hungarian refugees, and that Parliament be asked to approve the appropriation of \$1 million for Hungarian relief in general terms.

...

*Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet**Extract from Cabinet Conclusions*

SECRET

[Ottawa], November 23, 1956

Present

- The Prime Minister (Mr. St-Laurent) in the Chair.
- The Minister of Trade and Commerce and Minister of Defence Production (Mr. Howe).
- The Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Gardiner).
- The Minister of National Revenue (Dr. McCann).
- The Minister of Labour (Mr. Gregg).
- The Minister of Justice (Mr. Garson).
- The Minister of Public Works (Mr. Winters).
- The Minister of Veterans Affairs and Postmaster General (Mr. Lapointe).
- The Minister of Finance (Mr. Harris).
- The Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys (Mr. Prudham).
- The Minister of Fisheries (Mr. Sinclair).
- The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Mr. Pickersgill).
- The Minister of Transport (Mr. Marler).
- The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Bryce).
- The Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Martin).

IMMIGRATION: HUNGARIAN REFUGEES
(PREVIOUS REFERENCE NOV. 14)

1. *The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration* said that, until a few days ago, his officials in Vienna had been able to keep up with the applications of Hungarians to come to Canada. Now, however, these requests were being made at such a rate that they could not be dealt with as promptly as the situation demanded. As of yesterday, 657 people had applied but only 128 visas had been granted and 21 refused. If further steps were not taken to speed up processing, the feeling would grow here that red tape was nullifying the plans announced to help these refugees. He proposed, therefore, that he be authorized to waive the usual form of medical examination and to use funds, which were available in his appropriations, to charter aircraft to bring Hungarian refugees to Canada.

On the first point, all European countries had cut out their normal medical requirements. If his suggestion were approved, only a minimum medical examination would be given in Europe and X-ray and certain other examinations would be done on arrival in Canada, possibly in co-operation with the Department of Veterans Affairs. If a few cases of illness were discovered they would have to be admitted to hospital. There would probably be controversies with local authorities as to who would look after these unfortunate people, but these would just have to be faced and settled.

As regards chartering aircraft, the Canadian Pacific Air Lines had indicated it would be willing to arrange flights at quite reasonable rates between Vienna and Vancouver over the North Pole. Landing the immigrants in Vancouver was desirable because there was an Hungarian group there who would be willing to help their former countrymen, and Vancouver had always complained that it never seemed to get enough new arrivals. He hoped, too, that chartering arrangements at similarly reasonable rates could be made with Trans-Canada Air Lines.

2. *Mr. Pickersgill* added that he had already relaxed the regulations to the fullest extent possible under the law. To do more to hasten the arrival of the refugees necessitated these further arrangements and they, in turn, involved the assistance of other departments.

3. *The Cabinet* noted with approval the report of the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration on proposals for speeding up the flow of Hungarian refugees to Canada and agreed.

(a) that the normal medical examination requirements abroad, including X-ray, be waived, and undertaken on the arrival of these immigrants in Canada; and,

(b) that aircraft be chartered to bring successful applicants to this country; the detailed arrangements to be made by the Minister in consultation with the Ministers of Trade and Commerce and of Transport.

28.

DEA/2462-40

*L'ambassadeur en Union soviétique
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*
*Ambassador in Soviet Union
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 396

Moscow, November 24, 1956

CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.

HUNGARY

1. This afternoon Zakharov, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, handed to me Bulganin's reply dated today to Mr. St. Laurent's letter of November 13.¹⁸ Neither Zakharov nor I made any comment on reply. Zakharov said that it was not repeat not intended to publish reply. However if Mr. St. Laurent publishes his letter, the Soviet government will publish theirs.

2. Following is an official translation of text. "Dear Mr. Prime Minister

I have received your letter of November 13. The contents of your letter and also of your recent statements and of speeches of Canadian officials about situation in Hungary show that the Canadian government seem to have one sided tendentious and unobjective information about developments in Hungary and about position of Soviet Union on this question.

3. I would like to note that revolutionary workers peasants government of Hungary have shown in their statements that reactionary forces inside Hungary with active support of certain circles outside tried to overturn peoples' democratic régime in the country and establish a Horthy fascist régime. The inner patriotic forces of Hungary came out in defence of peoples' democratic régime asking for help of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary under the Warsaw Treaty.

4. As concerning position of the Soviet government on question of relations of Soviet Union with Hungary this has been fully set forth in "Declaration of Soviet Government on

¹⁸ Notes marginales /Marginal Notes:

Mr. Scaborn: Have we distributed to missions B's answer? R.A.D. F[ord]

Mr. Ford: Yes. To all those who received our tel[egram] giving text of PM's letter. J.B. S[caborn]

Foundation for Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship and Cooperation between Soviet Union and other Socialist States" published on October 31/56.

5. In your letter Mr. Prime Minister you raise the question of Soviet government giving assistance to international organizations to make it possible for them to render assistance and help to Hungarian people in food and medicine. This question is fully within competence of Hungarian government. As far as we know government of the Hungarian Peoples' Republic has already positively solved this question and Hungarian government has formally informed Secretary General of UN about this.

Yours sincerely,
N.A. Bulganin"

[D.M.] JOHNSON

29.

PCO

Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet

Extract from Cabinet Conclusions

SECRET

[Ottawa], November 28, 1956

Present

The Prime Minister (Mr. St-Laurent) in the Chair,
The Minister of Trade and Commerce and Minister of Defence Production (Mr. Howe),
The Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Gardiner),
The Minister of National Revenue (Dr. McCann),
The Minister of Labour (Mr. Gregg),
The Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson),
The Minister of Justice (Mr. Garson),
The Minister of Public Works (Mr. Winters),
The Minister of Veterans Affairs and Postmaster General (Mr. Lapointe),
The Minister of Finance (Mr. Harris),
The Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys (Mr. Prudham),
The Minister of Fisheries (Mr. Sinclair),
The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Campney),
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Mr. Pickersgill),
The Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources (Mr. Lesage),
The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Bryce),
The Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Martin),
The Registrar of the Cabinet (Mr. Halliday).

HUNGARIAN REFUGEES; FREE PASSAGE TO CANADA
(PREVIOUS REFERENCE NOV. 23)

54. *The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration* pointed out that Canada was the only country which had not offered free passage to Hungarian refugees who wished to emigrate from Europe. If the Federal government did not do this the Ontario government undoubtedly would. For this reason, and more particularly because these people were in most instances penniless, he recommended that assisted passage be made free, both for future cases and for those who had already arrived or were en route. Admittedly this would increase the number of problem cases which would have to be looked after in the future, but he hoped that the provinces would agree to accept this responsibility as their part in

this humanitarian effort. Sufficient funds were available in his appropriations, but a supplementary estimate might be required by the end of the fiscal year.

Over 90,000 refugees had reached Austria and the rate of arrivals had not decreased. So far 1200 applications had been made to come to Canada. He had no idea of how many might eventually be settled here but it did appear that those interested were excellent types, most of whom could start work immediately.

55. *Mr. Pickersgill* added that acceptance of his proposal would give rise to another problem. The Jewish Immigrant Aid Society had asked if the government would consider rendering aid to the Jews threatened with persecution in Egypt. No trouble had occurred there yet but it was a possibility to be kept in mind.¹⁹

56. *During the discussion* the following points emerged:

(a) The fact that passage was now being provided at varying rates was beginning to create difficulties. These might be overcome by treating as a debt for everyone only what amounted to tourist passage by sea, for which there was a precedent. There was no precedent, however, for completely free passage. On the other hand, this appeared to be the only just and humane thing to do and could be defended easily because of the unusual situation. In two or three months the offer of free passage could be withdrawn.

(b) Another reason for granting this further assistance was that facilities in Austria were being taxed to the limit and that country would be faced with a severe problem unless other countries did all they could to assist.

(c) It might be possible to induce the U.N. to request countries not receiving refugees to pay part of their transportation and settlement costs. It was doubtful if anything would come of this, however, as most nations with reasonably sized budgets were already helping directly.

57. *The Cabinet* noted with approval the report of the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, and agreed that free passage be offered to Hungarian refugees wishing to come to Canada and to those who had already arrived or were en route; an announcement to be made forthwith including a statement that the Minister was proceeding to Austria to ensure that everything was being done to move the refugees to Canada as quickly as possible.²⁰

...

30.

DEA/5475-EA-4-40

*Le ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l'Immigration
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

Ottawa, November 29, 1956

My dear Colleague:

¹⁹ Pour le texte d'une discussion sur ce problème, voir volume 22, document 205.

For a discussion of this problem, see Volume 22, Document 205.

²⁰ Voir Canada, ministère des Affaires extérieures, *Affaires Extérieures*, vol. 8, N° 12, p. 428.

See Canada, Department of External Affairs, *External Affairs*, Vol. 8, No. 12, p. 412.

I wish to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of November 9 which refers to the admission to Canada of Hungarian refugees.

I can assure you that during this emergency our officers are not applying too rigidly the health regulations now in effect. Instructions have already been issued to our officers in Vienna to waive the normal X-ray procedures, should they slow up the processing of applicants. As a matter of fact, in actual practice, refusals on medical grounds are now being limited to those with contagious diseases and to those who in their own interest should obviously not be moved.

It is inevitable under this drastic reduction of our medical examination standards, that some immigrants will require hospitalization on their arrival. It is hoped that other provinces will follow Ontario's example by making provision for treatment in such cases.

There are in fact no training requirements. Our officers are instructed to accept all immigrants who are willing and able to work, but we do try to advise prospective immigrants where in Canada their particular skills are most required and what conditions they are likely to encounter.

I agree that sponsored Hungarian refugees who have already received approval from this department but who lack exit visas, should be given special consideration if they appear along with other refugees before our immigration officials. Of course the main objective at present is to keep the flow maintained. Therefore our officials cannot be spared from their already very heavy duties to seek out those who may be in this position.

In order to facilitate the movement of Hungarians to Canada, we are providing free passage by air and sea on regular airline and ship service, and are arranging special chartered flights both to eastern and western Canada. Ocean shipping is being used to the fullest extent possible. Two hundred and fifty refugees are due in Quebec on December 8, and another four hundred on December 11th, and negotiations are under way for more space with other shipping companies.

Yours sincerely,

J.W. PICKERSGILL

31.

DEA/8508-40

Extrait du procès-verbal de la réunion hebdomadaire des directions

Extract from Weekly Divisional Notes

SECRET

Ottawa, December 3, 1956

I. THE UNITED NATIONS

1. *Further U.N. Resolutions on Hungary*

EUROPEAN DIVISION: On November 21 the United Nations General Assembly adopted by an overwhelming majority three more resolutions on Hungary. A Cuban resolution, imputing genocide to the U.S.S.R. because of the deportations from Hungary and urging compliance with previous resolutions, was passed with 55 countries in favour (including Canada), 10 against (Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia) and 14 abstentions. An Indian resolution calling on Hungary to admit United Nations observers was adopted by 57 votes in favour, 8 against (Soviet bloc, except Poland) and 14 abstentions. Krishna Menon's statement on Hungary was the most constructive and helpful the Indian delegation has made, and the Soviet delegation was said to be surprised and angry about the Indian initiative. The Soviet

bloc was isolated and split once more in the voting on a United States resolution concerning aid to Hungarian refugees, which was carried by 69 votes in favour (including Canada), only 3 against (Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Roumania) and 7 abstentions (Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Poland, Sweden, Sudan, Ukraine and Soviet Union).

Following the Secretary-General's report on November 30 that Hungary had still not complied with the Assembly's request for the admission of United Nations observers, the United States, British and French delegations co-operated (for the first time since the Suez action) in drafting a resolution recommending that the Secretary-General immediately dispatch his observers to the borders of Hungary. The resolution was introduced on December 3 under the sponsorship of 13 countries, and was carried on December 4 by a vote of 54 to 10 with 14 abstentions. Mr. Roch Pinard, heading the Canadian delegation in the absence of Mr. Pearson, spoke in support of the resolution and suggested that if the Hungarian government refused to co-operate, the United Nations should take stronger measures.²¹

The Hungarian government announced on December 3, after the latest U.N. initiative was under way, that it would be willing to have the Secretary-General visit Budapest "at a later date appropriate for both parties". Mr. Hammarskjöld then conferred with Imre Horvath, the Hungarian delegate to the United Nations, and has proposed December 16-18 as the dates for his visit to Hungary.

(CONFIDENTIAL.)

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32.

PCO

Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet

Extract from Cabinet Conclusions

SECRET

[Ottawa], December 5, 1956

Present

- The Minister of Trade and Commerce and Minister of Defence Production and Acting Prime Minister (Mr. Howe), in the Chair,
- The Minister of National Revenue (Dr. McCann),
- The Minister of Labour (Mr. Gregg),
- The Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson),
- The Minister of Justice (Mr. Garson),
- The Minister of Veterans Affairs and Postmaster General (Mr. Lapointe),
- The Minister of Finance and Acting Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Mr. Harris),
- The Minister of Fisheries (Mr. Sinclair),
- The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Campney),
- The Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources (Mr. Lesage),
- The Minister of Transport (Mr. Marler),
- The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Bryce),
- The Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Martin),
- The Registrar of the Cabinet (Mr. Halliday).

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²¹ Extraits du discours de M. Pinard sont reproduits dans Canada, ministère des Affaires extérieures, *Affaires Extérieures*, vol. 9, N° 1, pp. 8 à 9.

Extracts from Pinard's statement are reprinted in Canada, Department of External Affairs, *External Affairs*, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 8-9.

HUNGARIAN REFUGEES; ARRANGEMENTS WITH PROVINCES; REPORT
ON ARRIVALS

60. *Mr. Harris, as Acting Minister of Citizenship and Immigration*, said the Saskatchewan government had presented a plan for receiving and caring for Hungarian refugees in the province which might involve substantial federal expenditure, but which might be desirable to accept and use as a basis for negotiation with other provinces.

Saskatchewan proposed to establish and administer reception centres. The Federal government would be expected to pay \$3 a day for each refugee for such time as they were in these centres. If there were any expenditures for social aid, the Federal government would reimburse the province accordingly. It was also proposed that the Federal government pay the transportation costs to these centres and from them to places of employment. As regards medical examinations and hospitalization, the province would take X-rays and give vaccinations at its expense; for the first six months the Federal treasury would pay hospital costs, for the next six they would be shared equally, and after that the province would bear the full cost. Premier Douglas had asked that this latter feature be changed so that the Federal government pay full costs for a year, after which the responsibility would be assumed by the province.

The only really serious item in this proposal might be hospitalization costs, as it appeared that it would be relatively easy to establish refugees in Saskatchewan where there was already a substantial Hungarian community and a shortage of farm labour.

61. *During the discussion* the following points emerged:

(a) It might be helpful to re open the federal reception centres used for immigrants shortly after the war. Some of these were being occupied now as the refugees arrived and it was desirable to get the provinces to cooperate as soon as possible, particularly as the question of hospitalization would probably arise immediately.

(b) The great merit of the Saskatchewan proposal was that, at the province's initiative, it established a provincial responsibility. After a year the welfare of these refugees would be quite clearly the concern of the province. However, it had to be recognized that unless similar agreements were made with other provinces, this principle might not be generally recognized.

62. *Mr. Sinclair* reported on the arrival of the first group in British Columbia, and the arrangements made to look after them. The whole of the Hungarian state school of forestry, including faculty and students, would soon be coming to the province. The University of British Columbia had agreed to help as much as it could with this group, and accommodation had been arranged by the Powell River Pulp and Paper Company. Jobs could probably be found for most of them in the summer although the older professors might present a problem. Most members of the Hungarian State Opera Company had also indicated they wished to come to Canada, preferably as a unit. The settlement and integration of its members would obviously be more difficult.

63. *The Cabinet* noted the report of the Acting Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and of Mr. Sinclair on the arrival of Hungarian refugees and agreed, in principle, that Mr. Harris might work out arrangements with the provinces for sharing the costs of their care and welfare along the lines suggested by the government of Saskatchewan.

R.B. BRYCE
Secretary to the Cabinet